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Lawyering for a Cause and
Experiences from Abroad
Jayanth K. Krishnant
INTRODUCTION
For decades, observers have discussed the various roles that lawyers
can, and should, play in promoting social change. As far back as 1905,
Louis Brandeis argued that although "[t]he leading [U.S.] lawyers"' of the
time were primarily concerned with protecting the interests of corporations,
the bar had a responsibility to advocate for greater social and economic
equality on behalf of the general public.2 Some years later, Benjamin Twiss
challenged the prevailing perception of U.S. business lawyers as a ho-
mogenous group by documenting the anti-capitalist efforts of many of
these lawyers during the late 1800s and early 1900s.' In 1950, Willard
Hurst published his classic study in which he argued that the growth of
American law since independence stemmed in part from the evolving pres-
ence of lawyers in both politics and society.4 And just two years later,
Clement Vose, in his well-known book, Caucasians Only, recounted how
lawyers from the NAACP successfully fought against private, restrictive
property covenants that prohibited racial minorities from purchasing homes
in all-white residential communities.5
As the civil rights movement gained momentum in the 1950s and
1960s, a group of talented lawyers-including Thurgood Marshall,
Copyright © 2006 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
t Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, MN. J.D., Ohio State
University, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison. This study was completed while the author
served as the 2005 British Academy Visiting Professor, University of Edinburgh (U.K.), Centre for
South Asian Studies. For their insights, the author is grateful to Austin Sarat, Stuart Scheingold, Marc
Galanter, Arun Thiruvengadam, and Tom Hilbink. For their comments on very early versions of this
study, the author thanks Upendra Baxi, Kim Lane Scheppele, Gary Jacobsohn, and Phil Thomas.
1. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 313, 322
(1914). Brandeis gave the talk in which this chapter originated in 1905.
2. Id. at 339-40.
3. BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE
SUPREME COURT (1942).
4. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950).
5. CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959).
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Constance Baker Motley, Jack Greenberg, and others-rose in prominence
by using litigation to champion the rights of minorities. Social-justice
lawyering by these activists was touted as an effective strategy that could
bring about positive legal and political change. Beginning in the 1970s,
however, and continuing through the 1980s, several scholars began to take
a more critical look at these activist lawyers. In his highly cited 1970 study,
for example, Stephen Wexler described how poverty-rights lawyers often
purposely overlooked the immediate needs of their clients in their efforts to
achieve a greater good.6
Other studies soon followed, confirming the assertion that activist
lawyers too often ignored input from their clients, interested parties, and
potential political allies when determining how to advocate a cause.7 Such
lawyers tended to concentrate on litigation, ignoring extralegal advocacy
tactics with which their clients might be more familiar and comfortable.
Lawyers were also criticized for their arrogance and for promoting strate-
gies that aligned with their own skill sets. 8 Lawyers, according to the crit-
ics, framed claims and mobilized constituents mainly through rights-based
discourse and refused to devote necessary resources toward political and
grassroots efforts.9
Yet for more than a decade a growing body of scholarship has been
evaluating these critics' contentions.'" Two of the most prominent observ-
ers of activist, social justice, or what they call "cause lawyers" do are pro-
fessors Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold. For Sarat and Scheingold,
cause lawyering is defined as going "beyond a crude instrumentalism in
which lawyers sell their services without regard to the ends to which those
6. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1054 (1970). In this
study, Wexler famously recited a disturbing case where a lawyer refused to mention to an indigent
client that her child should seek medical treatment for a health condition. The lawyer worried that the
client would be less enthusiastic about championing the cause if she had to devote more time to
childcare. Id.
7. For a summary of this critique, see generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK
(1994) [hereinafter MCCANN, RIGHTS]; Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's
"Allurement": A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998). On the alienating effect of this
prioritization, see TIMOTHY J. O'NEILL, BAKKE AND THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY (1985).
8. See generally JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION
(1982); SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS
(1984).
9. See McCann & Silverstein, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 262-64. See
generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE (1974); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984) [hereinafter
Tushnet, An Essay].
10. A literature review of these rebuttal works is provided in Part Il1.
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services are put."' Instead, cause lawyers seek to "reconnect law and mo-
rality and make tangible the idea that lawyering is a 'public
profession,' . . . [where] lawyers [are] committed to using their
professional work as a vehicle to build [a] good society [and to] help
legitimate the legal profession as a whole.""2 To accomplish their mission,
cause lawyers can (and do) combine legal strategies with mass-based tac-
tics, and they frequently develop important coalitions across the tactical
spectrum to improve their clients' political power. 3
In fact, for Sarat and Scheingold the essence of cause lawyering is that
the lawyer seeks to create a legal and political consciousness that might
lead a cause's constituents to participate in the political process."
"[A]bstract programmatic commitments,"' 5 then, do not solely motivate
these lawyers. Instead, they act in versatile ways depending on their pro-
fessional and political backgrounds, their role vis-A-vis the cause or the
community they champion, the resources available to them, and the over-
arching political and societal attitudes of the day.16
Over the years, Sarat and Scheingold have conducted copious research
and collected rich empirical data to support their analysis of cause lawyer-
ing in the United States. What, then, is missing from the existing inquiry
into what cause lawyers do and their normative value in promoting social
change? In this study I argue that although the critics of cause lawyers on
the one hand, and scholars like Sarat and Scheingold on the other, have
made enormous contributions to the debate, only recently has the discourse
shifted to an important element of cause-lawyering that, until now, has re-
ceived limited attention. Building on this exciting new work, I suggest that
scholars should consider more closely how people working on a cause at
the grassroots level interact with, attempt to influence, and make demands
11. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional
Authority: An Introduction, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 3.
12. Id. (internal citations omitted).
13. See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A
GLOBAL ERA (2001) [hereinafter SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2001]; SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra
note 7.
14. For a general discussion of this idea of legal and political consciousness, see McCann &
Silverstein, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7; see also Robert L. Kidder & Setsuo
Miyazawa, Long-Term Strategies in Japanese Environmental Litigation, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 605
(1993).
15. McCann & Silverstein, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 262. For commentary
on the behavioral nuances that movement leaders can and do display, see Kevin R. Johnson, Civil
Rights & Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA
L.J. 42, 43-44 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Civil Rights].
16. These variables are drawn from McCann & Silverstein, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998,
supra note 7.
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of their lawyers, and how in turn these lawyers respond to such lay advo-
cacy. 17
In Part I of this Essay I present a brief history of the rise of cause
lawyering in the United States and the critiques of this phenomenon. In
Part II I provide a set of rebuttals to these critiques, including a detailed
discussion of the scholarly contributions of Sarat and Scheingold. I elabo-
rate in this Part how Sarat and Scheingold's research, their findings, and
even their purposive selection of the term "cause lawyer" have signifi-
cantly advanced our understanding of this subject. I"
In Part III I expand on my assertion that individuals involved in
causes at the grassroots level-and in particular grassroots leaders and ac-
tivists--can impact their lawyers' tactics in substantive ways." To show
the extent of this grassroots influence, I look beyond easily identifiable
activist practices such as boycotts and protests. Instead I focus on arguably
the most formal, technical tactic, one that Sarat and Scheingold acknowl-
edge remains key to cause lawyering: constitutional litigation.0
By drawing on the language of constitutional rights, cause lawyers
often engage in translating the immediate needs of their constituencies into
17. Several works are currently beginning to investigate the role of social-movement constituents
on cause-lawyering behavior. In fact, to their credit, Sarat and Scheingold are editing a forthcoming
book on this exact topic. See AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2006]. For a select set of scholars
writing in this area, see Kevin den Dulk, In Legal Culture, But Not of It: The Role of Cause Lawyers in
Evangelical Legal Mobilization, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2006, supra; Thomas Hilbink, The
Profession, the Grassroots, and the Elite: Lawyering for Civil Rights in the Direct Action Era, in
SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2006, supra; Lynn Jones, The Haves Come Out Ahead: How Cause Lawyers
Frame the Legal System for Movements, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2006, supra; Anna-Maria Marshall,
Social Movement Strategies and the Participatory Potential of Litigation, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD
2006, supra. Prabha Kotiswaran recently has argued that, in fact, lay constituents can themselves take
on the defacto role of the lawyer. Prahba Kotiswaran, Cause Lawyering for the Sexual Subaltern: The
Case of the Indian Sex Workers' Movement (2005) (unpublished paper presented at the Law and
Society Conference 2005, on file with author). As she puts it, these "lay-lawyers" often are more in
tune with the movement, and the frequent disconnect between the professional lawyer and the
grassroots constituents results from the former simply not being aware of the latter's needs. Id.
Kotiswaran emphasizes the lay-lawyer dimension (she, in fact, calls for an expansion of the term
"cause lawyer"). My study concentrates on how grassroots activists can help professional cause lawyers
formulate specific tactical strategies, including, arguably, the most formal of strategies, constitutional
litigation. Id.
18. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004) [hereinafter SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004]. This
book is the only one of their combined efforts in which Professor Scheingold's name is listed before
Professor Sarat's. In the text I refer to both scholars with Professor Sarat's name listed first.
19. 1 distinguish between leaders, organizers, and regularly engaged activists at the grassroots
level on the one hand, and those who play more of an occasional, ephemeral, or marginal role on the
other. I will focus on the work of the former in influencing cause lawyers, although I certainly
recognize that grassroots leaders, organizers, and activists can take their cues from lesser involved
constituents.
20. Their most recent book highlights this point. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18,
at 103-04; 121-31. Here I presuppose that the constitution the cause lawyer is drawing on is liberal and
democratic in nature.
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actual legal claims. Because the cause lawyer is procedurally familiar with
filing complaints and skilled in crafting substantive legal arguments, she is
in a unique position to draw upon and effectively use constitutional rheto-
ric to represent her constituents' cause in court-as well as in the political
sphere more generally.
Of course, that lawyers frame their arguments to conform to constitu-
tional language comes as no surprise to those who have studied U.S. law-
yers. 21 But not enough critical scholarship has examined why cause lawyers
invoke such rhetoric. The conventional assumption in legal scholarship on
U.S. cause lawyers is that the decision to use this strategy comes from the
lawyers themselves. After all, the lawyers are the experts who are skilled in
this rhetorical practice and, thus, are best able to determine how and when
to employ this strategy.
The second half of Part III focuses on three different grassroots
movements-the women's movement, the civil liberties movement, and
the environmental movement-in a different constitutionally-based and
democratic society: India. These movements illustrate Indian grassroots
leaders' involvement in assisting their lawyers, especially in recasting the
pressing concerns of everyday individuals into constitutionally recogniz-
able claims." As I will explain, the United States and India share a number
of important legal and constitutional similarities that makes such a com-
parative investigation useful. Many might think that because issues of caste
and other socioeconomic and political cleavages remain starkly present in
India, such "bottom-up" pressure would be rather unlikely. But, as my
findings and conclusion suggest, such pressure indeed is occurring in India,
offering those who study cause lawyering and constitutional litigation in
the United States an opportunity to reexamine the interaction between
grassroots activists and the lawyers who work on their behalf.
I
LAWYERS AS A FONT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: THE ELITISM CRITIQUE
Many scholars have long chastised social-activist lawyers for being
out of touch with the needs and concerns of those they represent.22 For ex-
ample, Professor Derrick Bell, a former lawyer for the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, argued nearly thirty years ago that he and many of his col-
leagues miscalculated the significance of using litigation to champion the
21. For a classic case supporting this point, see ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964)
(describing how lawyers connected the formal issue of the right to counsel with the immediate
problems facing Gideon and people in his situation).
22. Some of the literature cited, referenced, and reviewed here comes from the comprehensive
bibliography provided by McCann & Silverstein, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 288-
92.
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cause of racial balance in U.S. school districts.2 3 Civil rights lawyers so
vociferously pressed the rhetoric of achieving numerical equality in
schools that, along with judges and policymakers, they often prioritized
integration for integration's sake over ensuring that minority children
received strong educations.2 4 On paper, the Brown v. Board of Education25
decision and later court victories, validated the integrationist agenda, but,
according to Bell, ignored the real-life plight of millions of African
Americans who continued to lack access to quality educational opportuni-
ties.26
Other studies soon followed which also questioned the wisdom of
having lawyers serve as leaders of social causes. Joel Handler, in his 1978
project on lawyers and social movements, discovered that lawyers often
sought to manipulate and cajole poorer group members into pursuing liti-
gation rather than alternative modes of social change.27 In his 1982 book on
the Legal Services Corporation, Jack Katz found that an efficient division
of labor occurred between legal aid lawyers who worked in neighborhoods
(and provided more grassroots assistance) and those who worked in down-
town areas (and provided litigation assistance). However, when a lack of
resources forced decisions to be made between pursuing causes in court or
through politics, the lawyers typically opted to select the legal path, even if
that came at the expense of client demands. In a much harsher condemna-
tion, that same year Marshall Breger argued that Legal Services lawyers
tended to take on only those clients whose cases matched the lawyers' own
ideological biases, paying little attention to or altogether ignoring other
potential clients. 8 Scholars further underscored this type of sentiment re-
garding social-activist lawyers over the next several years.
Consider, for example, the number of works that emerged in 1984
alone. In that year, Peter Gabel and Duncan Kennedy published their well-
known parody of lawyers as compulsive actors who sought to "translate"29
the concerns of everyday people into a discourse that only lawyers could
understand. Susan Olson's 1984 work on the rights of the disabled showed
that the "dissociation"3 that Gabel and Kennedy believed existed between
lawyers and their clients could be minimized, but only when grassroots
activists, and not just lawyers, participated in shaping the political and
23. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); see also MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-50 (1987).
24. Bell, supra note 23, at 516.
25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. Bell, supra note 23, at 475-516.
27. HANDLER, supra note 8.
28. Marshall Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 282. 324
(1982).
29. Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1984).
30. Id.
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legal strategies of the movement.3 In fact, as Stephen Wasby uncovered in
his 1984 study, lawyers were not the most apt champions of a cause, even
in terms of litigation.32 Similarly, Mark Tushnet pointed out that same year
that advocating issues through contemporary rights-talk was inherently
indeterminate at best, and at worst "impede[d] [real] advances [in] progres-
sive social forces. 33
Throughout the 1980s, other studies evaluating the role of lawyers
emerged.34 Then in 1991, Gerald Rosenberg published his powerful book,
The Hollow Hope.35 Rosenberg focused on whether traditionally underrep-
resented movements are best served by turning to the judiciary to bring
about social change. 36 Given the institutional constraints facing the judici-
ary, which neither controls the congressional purse nor directs the military,
and the constitutional limitations on the cases it can take, courts,
Rosenberg claimed, cannot sua sponte make substantive social change.37
Yet because activist lawyers either are unaware of this point or simply dis-
regard it, the movements they lead often spend their limited resources on
strategies that yield minimal results, rather than on strategies that enhance
political mobilization.38 One year later, Gerald L6pez made a related criti-
cism of "progressive" lawyering in his book on the interaction between
lawyers and minority communities.39 More bluntly, Mary Ann Glendon has
noted that the "premature and excessive resort to the courts ... has been a
disaster for the political health of the country. '40
The underlying theme of these works is consistent: a disparity exists
between the cause lawyers' visions of the transformative power of the law
and the realities of the communities they represent. But there are those,
most notably Professors Sarat and Scheingold, who offer another perspec-
tive to this discussion, the development of which I explore in the next Part.
I
SARAT AND SCHEINGOLD: THE MANY SIDES OF THE "CAUSE LAWYER"
A. Prefacing the Sarat-Scheingold Project
Implicit in the aforementioned critique is that cause lawyers simply
fail to follow a tenet of the legal profession: a lawyer needs to maintain
31. OLSON, supra note 8.
32. Stephen L. Wasby, How Planned is "Planned Litigation "?, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 83
(1984).
33. Tushnet, An Essay, supra note 9, at 1364.
34. See, e.g., O'NEILL, supra note 7.
35. ROSENBERG, supra note 9.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 13-21.
38. Id.
39. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE (1992). For an evaluation of L6pez's thesis, see Kotiswaran, supra note 17.
40. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 270 (1994).
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what Max Weber might call a rational distance from the client, whereby
the lawyer is careful not to step outside the sphere of neutrality that embod-
ies her role as a professional advocate. William Simon discussed this "legal
professionalism norm"'" nearly thirty years ago, noting that although the
lawyer is charged with zealously defending her client's interests, principles
of professional conduct recommend retaining a detached, impartial stance
toward the larger implications of this advocacy. 42 The argument was that if
the legal professionalism norm was violated, and lawyers started to be
identified with, particularly, their less-popular clients, the negative image
associated with the clients might be transferred to the representing lawyers,
not to mention to the rest of the bar.43
Thereafter, a series of empirical studies sought to challenge Simon's
position and the above critics' views. In 1994, for example, Michael
McCann published his well-known book on lawyers and the pay-equity
movement in the United States." McCann found that many of the lawyers
he studied were not one-dimensional, litigation-focused actors. Certainly,
litigation was an option. But in general, most of the lawyers he observed
viewed litigation as just one in a range of available tactics. For practical
purposes, this had to be the case. Litigation took time, and given the pres-
sures lawyers faced from constituents and funders, movements simply
could not ignore other options that might well bring faster results.45
Moreover, even if a movement did prevail in court-which obviously was
no guarantee-there was still the concern that a favorable judgment would
not make an immediate difference in the lives of those on the ground.46
Thus, McCann found that lawyers who used the courts viewed litiga-
tion as a pragmatic tactic that offered both direct and indirect benefits-for
example, attracting political attention or raising public awareness of a
cause. 47  Many of the lawyers did coordinate litigation with other
41. This is the term I assign to this norm, although it draws on Weber's and Simon's discussion.
42. William Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 29, 36 (Lawyers are taught two "principle[s] of conduct. [One] principle prescribes the
lawyer remain detached from his client's ends... The second principle of conduct is partisanship. This
principle prescribes that the lawyer work aggressively to advance his client's ends.").
43. Id. at 41 ("[A] lawyer's neutrality is essential to the proper performance of his basic task ...
Since the legal system is independent of personal ends and social norms, the lawyer's ends and his
notions of social norms have no relevance .... Because ends are individual, subjective, and arbitrary, if
the lawyer attempted to take his ends into account in advising his client, he would reduce
the ... effectiveness of his services.").
44. MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 7.
45. Id.; see also STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY
(1995); Kevin R. den Dulk, Prophets in Caesar's Courts (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin-Madison).
46. See MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 7.
47. Id.; McCann & Silverstein, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 267; see also
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the Motivation
and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra, at 31; Stuart
Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice Sites and the Politicization of
[Vol. 94:575
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strategies.4" On the more formal side, lawyers lobbied the legislature, testi-
fying before committees and promoting the adoption of preferred statutory
language within bills.49 On the grassroots side, boycotts, pickets, and
marches were often used hand-in-hand with litigation.5 °
Soon after McCann's book came out, two other highly regarded
scholars embarked on a large-scale project to focus on the workings of
what they called "cause lawyers." For years, Professors Austin Sarat and
Stuart Scheingold had individually studied different dimensions of the le-
gal profession.51 In 1994 they teamed up to organize a conference in
Amherst, Massachusetts, to examine lawyers who intentionally challenged
the legal professionalism norm, who viewed clients as instrumental for
pursuing larger social and political goals, and who attempted to embody
the causes that they represented.52 Sarat and Scheingold recognized that
such lawyers could be "protean and heterogeneous"53 and could also be
found on the right, center, and left of the political spectrum. (In fact, for
this reason Sarat and Scheingold purposely eschew what they consider the
more restrictive term "public interest lawyer," which they suggest often
the Professional, 5 INT'L LEGAL PROF. 209 (1998); Susan Sterett, Caring About Individual
Cases: Immigration Lawyering in Britain, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra, at 293. Sterett's
valuable study of immigrants in Britain notes that lawyers working with the South Asian community
recognize that winning immigration cases in court is rare. Yet these lawyers have not abandoned this
tactic, namely because "litigation can be a way of gaining public time. Cases can be part of an effort to
elevate an issue to the political agenda, occupying time in Parliament and the newspapers." Sterett, in
SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra, at 310; see also Susan Bibler Coutin, Cause Lawyering in the
Shadow of the State: A U.S. Immigration Example, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2001, supra note 13, at
117.
48. McCann & Silverstein, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 267
49. See MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 7; Jayanth K. Krishnan, New Politics, Public Interest
Groups, and Legal Strategies in the United States and Beyond (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin-Madison). For a more general set of works that discusses how various tactics
are used by group leaders, see JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS 212-52 (1977); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW
CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICY MAKING 65 (1993); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN &
JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150 (1986); Thomas L. Gais &
Jack L. Walker, Jr., Pathways to Influence in American Politics, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN
AMERICA 103, 104-11 (Jack L. Walker, Jr. ed., 1991); Anthony J. Nownes & Patricia Freeman, Interest
Group Activity in the States, 60 J. POL'Y 86, 88, 92 (1998).
50. MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 7. This point has also been made by others. See CHARLES R.
EPp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 3-8 (1998) (noting that for a litigation strategy and legal mobilization overall to retain
sustenance, there has to be pressure from below in the form of various grassroots advocacy tactics,);
FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND
STATE 42 (1976); Jayanth K. Krishnan & Kevin R. den Dulk, So Help Me God, 30 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 233, 239-48 (2002) (noting that the "ideas" and tactics from bottom-up grassroots activists
helped mobilize religious legal mobilization in the United States, India, and Israel).
51. For a select sample of works, see SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7; Austin Sarat,
Law's Two Lives: Humanist Visions and Professional Education, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1993);
Scheingold & Bloom, supra note 47.
52. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18.
53. Id. at4.
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connotes a general welfare, non-partisan type of lawyering.) Despite such
variation, Sarat and Scheingold have argued consistently that "recurrent
themes and patterns"54 exist among these professionals that make studying
them both empirically and theoretically worthwhile.
For example, Sarat and Scheingold believe that cause lawyers, unlike
more detached conventional lawyers, view their lawyering as the represen-
tation or manifestation of their own personal, moral, political, and profes-
sional values." According to this view, cause lawyers are partisan; their
passion for pursuing changes that affect public policy make them political
as well as legal actors. 6 In other words, cause lawyers use the law to help
redistribute power within their communities." By employing legal dis-
course and "rights-talk" 5 8-as well as various forms of political action-
they seek to crystallize their constituents' aspirations and to affect how,
and to what degree, political mobilization occurs.59 As Sarat and
Scheingold suggest, "cause lawyers have something to believe in and bring
their beliefs to bear in their work lives. 60
B. Opportunities for and Constraints on Cause Lawyering
Since that first conference in Amherst over a decade ago, Sarat and
Scheingold have led this burgeoning field of scholarship as co-authors of
numerous articles on cause lawyering and as co-editors of volumes of es-
says.6' Their recent and arguably most important work on this subject,
Something to Believe In (2004), culminates years of research on U.S. cause
lawyers. In the United States, they argue, the legal profession, law schools,
legal practice setting, and political environment are spheres in which cause
lawyering manifests itself and encounters both opportunities and con-
straints.62
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2-4.
57. Id. at 9 (noting that "[c]ause lawyers tend to transform the nature of legal advocacy-
becoming advocates not only, or primarily, for their clients but for causes and, one might say, for their
own beliefs. In thus reversing the priorities of the organized legal profession and in staking out the
moral high ground, cause lawyers challenge their professional community.").
58. See, e.g., Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in SARAT
& SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 69. For an overview and subsequent critique of this point, see
GLENDON, supra note 40.
59. As McCann & Silverstein observe, cause lawyers focus on political mobilization, in
particular, because they are often "highly circumspect, critical, and strategically sophisticated about the
pitfalls of legal action, the 'liberal' biases of legal norms, and the imperatives of effective political
struggle." McCann & Silverstein, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 266.
60. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 2.
61. Another volume is also on the way this year, dealing with the issue of cause lawyers and
social movements. See SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2006, supra note 17.
62. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18.
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First, in terms of the legal profession, indeed the norm that a lawyer
must maintain a certain distance from her client's values or the causes as-
sociated with her client's case continues to loom. 63 But according to Sarat
and Scheingold, given the bar's current low standing among the general
population, the public sentiment that lawyers too often fail to "do good"
has, to a certain extent, forced the relaxation of this conventional norm.'
The profession's standard-bearers today thus encourage lawyers to pursue
cause-lawyering opportunities, which might enhance the profession's pub-
lic image.65 As Sarat and Scheingold explain, though, the profession is
quick to constrain those whose cause-lawyering activities begin to under-
mine either the bar or the bar's general vision of how concepts such as jus-
tice, rights, and equality are defined.6 6
Law schools also offer a combination of opportunities and constraints
to cause lawyering.67 Most law schools proudly proclaim that their institu-
tions exist in large part to produce lawyers who will serve the needs of so-
ciety. Students with visions of making the world a more just and egalitarian
place often find their law school clinics to be havens for putting "law-into-
action., 68 However, as Sarat and Scheingold describe, much of the rest of
law school runs in stark contrast to such cause-lawyering ideals. Generally,
law school curriculum and pedagogy tend to emphasize the importance of
traditional, conventional lawyering skills. 69 Where cause-lawyering activity
exists, it does so at the margins-in the one or two clinical courses students
take or within more outright political organizations on campus.7"
The legal practice setting is a third forum where cause lawyering ex-
periences both opportunities and constraints.7" According to Sarat and
63. See id. ch. 2; see also Simon, supra note 42.
64. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 40-44.
65. See id. ch. 2.
66. Id. at 49 (noting that "[t]he profession accommodates lawyers who construct their practices
around the goals of serving causes and targeting clients whose cases further causes which the lawyers
favor-at least so long as those causes act within the domain of liberal-legality."). Such cause-
lawyering activity typically involves ensuring procedural justice rather than creating new rights or
subverting conventions upon which the bar itself is based.
67. See id. ch. 3.
68. This phrase has become quite well-known among those who study legal education. It comes
from the University of Wisconsin Law School, and according to the institution, it means a "belief that
law must be studied in action as it relates to society, and not in isolation. [Wisconsin's] legal tradition is
a strong part of who we are. The Law School focuses on helping its students understand how law both
affects and is affected by every other institutional force in society." University of Wisconsin Law
School, Information for Prospective Students, http://www.law.wisc.edu/prospective/action.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2005).
69. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 53-54 (noting that "to fully appreciate the
tensions and ambivalent relationship between cause-lawyering and the professional project of the
organized bar, it is necessary to understand law school's powerful socializing messages-privileging
private practice in general and elite law firms in particular and privileging, as well, analytic distance
rather than political commitment.").
70. See id at 67-69.
71. See id. ch. 4.
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Scheingold, there is a continuum. At one end, only limited cause lawyering
occurs within certain settings, such as corporate law firms.72 Although
there are incentives to engage in cause lawyering (such as receiving posi-
tive publicity), the structure of this work environment tends to constrain
cause lawyering to narrow issues that do not jeopardize firm profits or con-
flict with wealthy client interests.
73
Toward the middle of the continuum is what Sarat and Scheingold call
"salaried attorneys," who typically work in public agencies or for non-
governmental organizations. By not having to worry about generating fees
from clients or working grueling corporate hours, salaried lawyers can fo-
cus on advocating for causes in which they believe, legally and politi-
cally.74 But even with this relative flexibility, salaried lawyers are
constrained by several factors, including their own personal politics that
sometimes conflict with their required duties, institutional rules within
their job setting that limit their options, and the availability of outside re-
sources to fund their employment positions.75
At the other end of the continuum are cause lawyers who work in
small firms. Lawyers in this setting usually share the same ideological
commitments, allowing them to engage in relatively more active cause
lawyering than their counterparts.76 Yet given the competition within the
legal market, these small-firm lawyers still are required to pay close atten-
tion to the financial bottom line, which makes their practice and ultimately
their cause-lawyering activities less stable.77
72. Id. This idea of a continuum draws on an article Scheingold published in 1998 with Anne
Bloom. They refer to cause lawyering behavior as falling on a continuum of "transgressiveness."
Transgressiveness, for Scheingold and Bloom, has a very specific meaning. That is, the "professional
standards of legal practice"-especially the standard emphasizing the "professional" role the lawyer is
to play vis-A-vis her client-are pushed to their limits and beyond by the cause lawyer. See Scheingold
& Bloom, supra note 47, at 212. Yet transgressive cause lawyering has different gradations, and as
Scheingold and Bloom note, its manifestation "varies widely among cause lawyers." Id. at 213. Other
factors matter, too, such as political ethos, market for legal services, and personal motivations. Note
that others also have observed how motivations affect cause lawyers' behavior. See, e.g., HANDLER,
supra note 8; Austin Sarat, Between (the Presence oJ) Violence and (the Possibility o)9
Justice: Lawyering Against Capital Punishment, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 317;
Menkel-Meadow, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 31; Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinski,
Destruction of Houses and Construction of a Cause: Lawyers and Bedouins in the Israeli Courts, in
SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra note 7, at 227. Research by den Dulk highlights how motivations
and ideology shape strategies not just of traditionally studied liberal cause lawyers, but of right-wing,
religious lawyers as well. See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the
Meaning of "Public Interest Law", 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223 (2005); den Dulk, Prophets in Caesar's
Court, supra note 45.
73. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 74-80.
74. Id. at 80-88; see also Scheingold & Bloom, supra note 47, at 235-36.
75. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 80-88.
76. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 88-97.
77. Id. Note that, as Scheingold and Bloom show, prioritizing economic considerations, on
occasion, also means having to decline more open-ended, riskier cases that the small-firm lawyer may
believe are socially worthy or politically exciting. Scheingold & Bloom, supra note 47, at 246. For
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The final platform in which cause lawyering can emerge-the democ-
ratic political environment-is conceptually broader than the venues dis-
cussed above. For Sarat and Scheingold, cause lawyers who value, respect,
and believe in adhering to the current rules of the democratic process tend
to be more successful in their advocacy than those who pursue more
"transformative agendas."78 When working on behalf of their constituents,
all cause lawyers, to one extent or another, attempt to extract concessions
from those they are challenging.79 But how this extraction occurs will de-
termine whether the cause lawyer is part of mainstream political advocacy
or on the margins." Cause lawyers who are able to employ democratically
acceptable techniques to fight their cause-such as engaging in constitu-
tional litigation8 t -are more likely to see their positions validated by those
in power, compared to cause lawyers who use extralegal tactics to mobilize
"against the law and against the grain of mainstream politics." 2
Sarat and Scheingold end their book by briefly reviewing the literature
on cause-lawyering behavior in other parts of the world and then discuss-
ing the challenges many of these advocates face, particularly in nondemoc-
ratic societies. Without question, Sarat and Scheingold have made a
significant contribution to our understanding of this dimension of the legal
profession. But what happens when we look at how other actors-who,
until now, have received only limited attention-affect cause-lawyering
behavior? By examining three separate movements in the country of India,
I explain in the next Part how grassroots leaders can not only serve as the
driving force behind what cause lawyers do generally, but also how these
activists can shape the "bedrock of cause lawyering" 3  strategies-
constitutional litigation.
many small-firm lawyers who enter this career with hopes of transforming the legal system, such
dreams confront the economic, political, and emotional hardships that accompany this type of practice.
Ambitions of making widespread change are replaced by goals of helping those on an individual, case-
by-case level. A rich set of data supports Scheingold and Bloom's assertion that practice site and
lawyer motivations affect transgressiveness. The authors are sensitive to the variations within each of
these work areas. Not all small-firm cause lawyers act in a highly transgressive manner; likewise, not
all corporate cause lawyers are shackled to the norms that govern their practices. Furthermore, they
emphasize that their model is not static, nor is their classification scheme mutually exclusive. Their
continuum simply illustrates general patterns that they hope move us toward a more comprehensive
theory of cause-lawyering behavior.
78. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 103.
79. For a discussion of this point, see MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 168-70.
80. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, ch. 5.
81. See id. at 130 (noting that mainstream tactics like constitutional litigation offer "institutional
access, legitimacy, and bargaining leverage [to the cause lawyer, whereas] ... those who challenge
core premises of liberal democracy-irrespective of whether the challenge comes from the left or the
right-are generally deprived of the opportunities afforded by constitutional litigation").
82. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 131.
83. Id. at 130.
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III
INFLUENCING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM-MAKING FROM THE BOTTOM UP
A. Cause Lawyers, Grassroots Organizers, and Constitutional Litigation
in India: Setting the Stage
Cause lawyers, as we have seen, engage in a variety of legal and po-
litical techniques when pursuing their mission. With that said, however,
even Sarat and Scheingold recognize that many cause lawyers advocate
through the method they know best-constitutional litigation.84 It is true
that constraints accompany constitutional litigation. Pursuing such a tactic
can take years before those seeking redress are granted rewards. In addi-
tion, unless the constitutional lawyering is done on a pro bono basis, this
tactic can be expensive. And there is always the question of whether even
after a favorable constitutional ruling, real-life change will occur at the
grassroots level. But constitutional litigation does offer a set of important
opportunities as well. Along with allowing the cause lawyer to exhibit her
skills and passion for an issue in the public courtroom, "constitutional
litigation provides institutional access, legitimacy, and bargaining
leverage."85 Constitutional litigation tends to be a prestigious form of legal
practice, and although it can rattle both the bar and government officials
when it seeks to alter the status quo, it retains acceptance as a valid form of
political advocacy within the United States.
For the remainder of this study, I will explore the use of constitutional
litigation by cause lawyers within another democratic context-India. India
is a useful case for observers of U.S. cause lawyering, because India and
the United States share a number of similarities. Both countries are consti-
tutional democracies; in fact, the Indian Constitution, although much
longer in length, draws on principles within the U.S. Constitution.86 Both
countries also have strong bar associations87 and well-respected Supreme
Courts that possess the power of judicial review.88 (It is also not uncom-
mon for the Indian Supreme Court to follow an American judicial approach
to issues of civil rights and civil liberties.89) In addition, for over fifty years
U.S. lawyers and judges have frequently interacted with their Indian coun-
terparts, exchanging ideas on topics that include legal education, alterna-
tive dispute resolution, and constitutional jurisprudence, just to name a
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Epp, supra note 50, at 77.
87. For one example of how strong the Indian bar association is, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, Social
Policy Advocacy and the Role of the Courts in India, 21 AM. ASIAN REV. 91, 121 (2003).
88. See Epp, supra note 50, at 80-81; Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Three Models of Secular
Constitutional Development: India, Israel, and the United States, 10 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1 (1996).
89. See, e.g., S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA 12, 19, 122-23 (2002).
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few.90 And both countries have witnessed a growth in cause-oriented grass-
roots movements, with the Indian mobilization notably occurring in the
post-colonial era, after the end of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's
Emergency Rule in 1977.91
The similarity most important for our analysis, however, is that, as in
the United States, there are those Indian cause lawyers who routinely rely
on constitutional litigation as the key vehicle for advocating social change.
Generally under-analyzed in both settings, though, are the conditions under
which cause lawyers draw upon constitutional language and rhetoric to
translate the struggles facing those they represent into recognizable claims
that courts can handle. One often assumes that cause lawyers-as the legal
experts most familiar with the judicial process-unilaterally decide how
and when to craft such arguments.
Yet, as I will show, leaders at the grassroots frequently help paint the
full picture for their cause lawyers as these lawyers work to recast what can
be life-or-death problems into constitutionally acceptable language. This
proposition draws on the most recent scholarship on cause lawyering,
which itself has been influenced by the broader, theoretical scholarship on
social-movement mobilization.92 For example, in his work on the Christian
evangelical movement in the United States, Kevin den Dulk shows how
grassroots religious leaders have used their "intellectual resources ... [to]
generate and shape the[ir] attorneys' motivations and tactics."93 Thomas
Hilbink, in his historiography of the civil rights movement, highlights how
grassroots activists helped provide "visions" to their lawyers championing
racial equality both in the courts and in the political sphere.94 And there
90. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford
Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL IST. 447 (2005).
91. See Epp, supra note 50, at 76, 83-85.
92. For a selected sample of the social-movement literature that is referenced in current cause-
lawyering scholarship, see DOUG McADAM ET AL., COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS
(1996); DOUG MCADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER (1988); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY: 1930-1970 (1982); JOHN D. MCCARTHY & MAYER N. ZALD,
THE TREND OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION (1973); SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE
ACTION, AND POLITICS (1994); Nick Hopkins & Steve Reicher, Social Movement Rhetoric and the
Social Psychology of Collective Action: A Case Study ofAnti-Abortion Mobilization, 50 HuM. REL. 261
(1997); Doug McAdam et al., Social Movements, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY 695 (Neil J. Smelser
ed., 1988); Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and
Activism, 99 AM. J. Soc. 640 (1993); John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and
Social Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. Soc. 1212 (1977); Aldon D. Morris & Suzanne
Staggenborg, Leadership in Social Movements, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (David. A. Snow et al. eds., 2004).
93. Den Dulk, supra note 45.
94. See Hilbink, supra note 17. Elsewhere, Hilbink also discusses lawyering on behalf of a cause-
oriented movement as the product of pressure from and influence by grassroots activists. See Thomas
M. Hilbink, You Know the Type... : Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657
(2004).
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have been other scholars who have discussed how "activists work to
collectively frame the cause"95 for their lawyers, including studies by
Jones,96 Shamir and Chinski,97 Barclay and Fisher,98 Marshall,99 and
others.' ° Ultimately, all these observations suggest that the lawyering done
on behalf of those at the grassroots is not an isolated endeavor. Instead,
cause lawyering is found to be contextual/situational and dependent upon
existing opportunities, resources, and frames.10 ' In addition, it can be a co-
operative, interactive enterprise between those doing the formal represent-
ing and those being represented.
Before proceeding, I highlight two additional points. Notwithstanding
the above-mentioned similarities between India and the United States, one
important difference lies in the structures of the two systems' legal profes-
sions. Because of its unique constitutional/legal structure, any cause
lawyering that occurs in India tends to be more the exception than the rule.
For most Indian lawyers, negotiating, strategizing, fostering a shared un-
derstanding of the law, advising, and participating in political activism are
generally tasks that are left to others." 2 Most also do not work at mobiliz-
ing or nurturing social movements.0 3 Indian lawyers typically become in-
volved in causes late in the game, and their ties to clients and activists are
fleeting."° This is because most are atomistic, solo practitioners who deal
95. See Jones, supra note 17.
96. Id. (arguing forcefully that cause-lawyering scholars should consider how social-movement
theorists for years have discussed the "opportunity structures" that grassroots activists provide for
lawyers).
97. See Shamir & Chinski, supra note 72.
98. See Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers and Social Movements, Failure and
Success: Comparing the Two Waves of Same Sex Marriage Litigation, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2006,
supra note 17 (noting how the activism of social movements helped spur cause lawyers to argue for
same-sex marriage rights in Washington state and elsewhere).
99. See Marshall, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2006, supra note 17 (noting how environmental-
justice activists push cause lawyers to realize that policy initiatives need to be directed toward the
general public, rather than the elites).
100. In his rich essay discussing the intersection between cause lawyering and grassroots activism,
Thomas Hilbink refers to other studies that also underscore how lawyers can be affected and influenced
by a movement. See Hilbink, You Know the Type, supra note 94, at 681-88. For a selected sample of
the studies to which Hilbink refers, see Coutin, supra note 47; Lisa Hajjar, From the Fight for Legal
Rights to the Promotion of Human Rights: Israeli and Palestinian Cause Lawyers in the Trenches of
Globalization, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2001, supra note 13, at 68; John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause
Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD
1998, supra note 7, at 181; Stephen Meili, Cause Lawyers and Social Movements: A Comparative
Perspective on Democratic Change in Argentina and Brazil, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 1998, supra, at
487; Shamir & Chinski, supra note 72.
101. For a discussion of these points, see Michael McCann & Jeffrey Dudas, Backlash: Mapping
the Changing Context of Movement Lawyering, in SARAT & SCHEINGOLD 2006, supra note 17.
102. This point was made several years back by Marc Galanter. Marc Galanter, New Patterns of
Legal Services in India, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN INDIA 279 (1989); see also Marc Galanter,
Fifty Years On, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 57 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000).
103. Supra note 102.
104. Id.
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with clients, cases, and causes in a discrete, isolated fashion. Rarely are
there long-term objectives vis-A-vis clients." 5 Furthermore, because indi-
viduals and groups interested in cause-oriented issues tend to lack re-
sources and high levels of organization, they do not provide a market for
lawyers who otherwise may wish to help but are unable to because of their
own constraints.
Another problem is that the institutional structure of the Indian courts
is more conducive to abuse than to cause lawyering. Procedural laws allow
opposing counsel to submit endless interlocutory appeals, resulting in mas-
sive delays in judgments and vast backlogs in cases. 6 Because these oppo-
sition lawyers are traditionally paid per court appearance, they have little
incentive to resolve cases with cause lawyers in a timely fashion.0 7
Opposition lawyers become masters in the art of perpetuation and manipu-
late procedural rules to delay cases for decades.1 t
Thus, the conditions seem far from ripe for any type of cause lawyer-
ing-let alone constitutional cause lawyering-to exist in India. But de-
spite these unfavorable conditions, some lawyers have been able to act as
constitutional cause lawyers, primarily in the upper courts. 9
In the next Section, I discuss how the Indian Constitution, and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of it, has facilitated such "claim-
making.""' After 1977, the Supreme Court provided greater opportunities
for lawyers who practice in these upper courts to draw upon the language
105. Id.
106. In 2002, the Indian Civil Procedure Code was overhauled, with the intent to reduce the
number of these types of appeals. It is uncertain whether such a change will make a substantive
difference in how the system operates. See Speedier Justice Becomes Reality, TIMES (Chandigarh) July
1, 2002, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020702/nation.htm.
107. Id.; see also Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Bread for the Poor": Access to Justice
and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789 (2004).
108. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 107. years ago, a well-known story told in The New York
Times detailed a relatively simple property dispute between two neighbors that began in 1961 and
ended after thirty-nine years of litigation. Apparently a milkman had built a wall with two drains that
leaked into a meat cutter's yard. The meat cutter had won a judgment in 1961 that declared the drains
illegal, but because of the inordinate number of appeals allowed by the Indian legal process, the case
remained open for almost four decades-long after both parties were dead! See Barry Bearak, In India,
the Wheels of Justice Hardly Move, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2000, at Al. Note that government lawyers, as
well, can intentionally delay the process, particularly in cases where the government is seeking to
postpone a final outcome in a case where it is being sued.
109. In India, most lawyers practice exclusively in one of three settings: a lower-level district
court, a state High Court, or the Supreme Court. A number of factors determines where one practices.
For example, upon graduation from law school, an Indian lawyer interested in practicing usually will
take up an apprenticeship with an experienced lawyer who practices in one of three courts. Where that
law graduate starts will depend on several variables, including law school performance, geographic
location, personal ambition, connections, caste ties, and the like. Commonly, the court where the law
graduate apprentices will be the court in which she practices as a lawyer until she retires.
110. This term is a spinoff from the famous article by William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel &
Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15
LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1981).
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of the Constitution of India to promote cause-oriented agendas."'
Following this discussion, I focus on how Indian cause lawyers have en-
gaged in struggles for women's rights, civil liberties, and the environment.
In particular, I examine how the active aid of grassroots leaders has
enabled cause lawyers to recast the immediate legal needs of individuals
into broad arguments for the affirmative enforcement of constitutional
rights.
B. The Indian Constitution: A Rhetorical Resource for Mobilization
On January 26, 1950, India's Constitution "came into force""' 2 as the
supreme law of the newly independent nation-state. Touted as one of the
most detailed documents of its kind,' the Indian Constitution sought to
guarantee integrity and respect for every Indian citizen, to alleviate the so-
cial and economic ills of the past, and to establish representative governing
institutions." 4 Today, the Constitution has twenty-two parts, twenty-plus
chapters, nearly four hundred separate articles, a detailed appendix (known
as the section of schedules), and a set of directive, nonjusticiable public
policy principles. 15 Embedded as well are the "fundamental rights" guar-
anteed to every Indian. These fundamental rights include the right to equal-
ity, the right to freedom, the right against exploitation, the right to practice
one's religion, cultural and economic rights, the right to private property,
and the right to constitutional remedies." 6
These fundamental rights enable lawyers to advocate issues in court
such as women's rights, civil liberties, and environmental rights. In a mo-
ment, I will explain precisely how lawyers have used these fundamental
rights to advance such agendas. Before doing so, it is important to note that
until about 1977, Indian courts heard very few of these types of cases.
According to the Indian constitutional law scholar S.P. Sathe, the pre-1977
"clientele" of the courts mainly included landlords fighting governmental
land reform initiatives, industrialists opposing nationalization efforts, and
citizens complaining about the lack of governmental services.' 7 As Sathe
contends, during this period India lacked a public interest legal culture and
111. As we will see in the next Section, and as the Court has held over the years, the constitution
of India is a document lined with deep social-justice and public-policy values. For a discussion of this
point, see GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1966); Epp,
supra note 50; GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA'S SECULARISM IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT (2003); A.G. NOORANI, CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS IN
INDIA (2000); SATHE, supra note 89.
112. P.M. BAKSHI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 19 (1998).
113. Id.
114. See AUSTIN, supra note I 11.
115. See INDIA CONST.; BAKSHI, supra note 112.
116. INDIA CONST. pt. III; Jacobsohn, supra note 88.
117. See SATHE, supra note 89.
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as such most cases litigated did not involve women's rights, environmental
rights, or civil liberties.1"'
Why, then, did Indian courts see an increase in constitutional claims
made on these fronts after 1977? One frequent argument is that the end of
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Emergency Rule in the same year provided
the "watershed [moment] in Indian politics .... [when] intellectuals and
political leaders began looking to the courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, for a means of checking the power of the state."' 19 During the
Emergency period, which lasted from 1975 to 1977, Mrs. Gandhi ruled by
decree, arguing that the state faced a national security threat from opposi-
tion forces in the country. 2 ' She imprisoned thousands of political foes,
suspended the fundamental rights of the Constitution, and pushed into law
the forty-second amendment, which barred judicial review of parliamen-
tary changes to the Constitution.12' The Supreme Court caved to many of
Mrs. Gandhi's demands between 1975 and 1977. With the restoration of
democratic rule, however, the Court quickly tried to repair its reputation by
appointing commissions to investigate human rights abuses; enlarging pub-
lic access to legal representation; implementing an "epistolary jurisdiction"
in which judges affirmatively responded to grievances petitioned by third
parties, letters, or independent news reports; and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, relaxing standing requirements.'22
118. See id. at 52-62. Sathe notes that a public-interest culture failed to thrive during the first three
decades of Indian independence because India's democracy had not yet fully consolidated. Disputes
over what type of power different governing institutions would hold were frequent. In 1967, for
example, the Supreme Court ruled that no institution, including the Parliament, could alter or abridge
the fundamental rights of the Constitution. See Nath v. Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643, 1644. Although
it reversed this decision some six years later, the Court still held in the subsequent case that the
Constitution had a basic structure to it--exemplified by the fundamental fights-with which no
institution could tamper. Kesavananda v. Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. Such lack of democratic
institutional consolidation seems, according to Sathe, to account for why public-interest advocacy had
trouble finding receptive governmental outlets.
119. Epp, supra note 50, at 76.
120. Grassroots activists remained skeptical. They cited several self-interested factors that caused
her to suspend the constitution: the economy was weak; the public disapproved of her policies, leading
to opposition leaders calling on the military to oust her from power; and she was convicted of
corruption charges in a state court in Gujarat. For a discussion of this point and, more generally, Indian
political developments following 1947, see PAUL BRASS, THE POLITICS OF INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE
(1994).
121. Epp, supra note 50, at 76; see also GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2000) [hereinafter AUSTIN, WORKING].
122. See Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operations and Limitations of the
World's Most Active Judiciary, 19 POL'Y STUD. J. 140 (1990); Rajeev Dhavan, Law as
Struggle: Public Interest Law in India, 36 J. INDIAN L. INST. 302 (1994); NOORANI, supra note 11. In
addition, unlike in the United States, where courts typically hear cases only when issues are "ripe,"
Indian courts routinely rule on issues that may be "premature." See SATHE, supra note 89, at 198. As
early as 1959, the Supreme Court gave judges the green light to render decisions on issues that may be
tangentially related to the case at hand. See Nath v. Comm'r, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149. But since the end of
the Emergency, the Supreme Court has been less willing to enforce the statute of limitations on even
long-delayed claims when it believes that such cases have public or societal ramifications. See, e.g.,
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Article 32 of the Indian Constitution guarantees individual stand-
ing to petition "for the enforcement of [fundamental] rights conferred by
this Part" and authorizes the Supreme Court to issue appropriate orders to
enforce those rights. 123 After 1977, the Supreme Court interpreted article 32
as allowing claimants to petition it directly in matters where the central
government allegedly infringed upon their constitutional rights. 24 In addi-
tion, the Court began to read article 226 of the Constitution as giving any
claimant alleging a state violation of a fundamental right, or a state viola-
tion of a public law statute, standing to file suit in a state high court.1 25 The
Jalmi v. Speaker, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 703. This has been particularly important for individuals advocating
on behalf of the above-mentioned issues, as it has given these potential claimants more time to file their
cases. Also, since 1977, the Court proudly has engaged in extensive legislative policy making in a
variety of public-interest cases. By interpreting as part of its constitutional duties the ability to make
policy, the Court has weighed in on an array of public-policy areas, including education, see Kishen v.
Orissa, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 677; commercial banking, see Jain v. India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 292; health care,
see Pullers v. Punjab, A.1.R. 1981 S.C. 14; and, as we will see, other important public-policy areas. The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitution's "writ jurisdiction" after 1977 also has allowed for
more public interest cases to come forward. See, e.g., Morcha v. India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802. Other
factors also played a role in the change in constitutional claims' subject matter after 1977. Desai and
Muralidhar discuss how after the Emergency, the ruling government was weak and unable to deal with
demands made by public-interest activists. Ashok H. Desai & S. Muralidhar, Public Interest
Litigation: Potential and Problems, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE, supra note 102, at 159, 162. The
courts thus were seen as the best administrative institution to handle such claims. In addition, the
"support structure for legal mobilization," for a short while, strengthened in the post-Emergency years.
Epp, supra note 50, at 95. Foreign and domestic funding that supported new, public-interest litigation
efforts also increased. Id. at 95-103.
123. For further discussion of article 32's grant of standing, see Krishnan & den Dulk, supra note
50. See also Epp, supra note 50, at 81-82 ("[T]he Indian Supreme Court's jurisdiction is remarkably
broad. It has original jurisdiction over disputes between the national government and the states and
between different states; it has appellate jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases,... and it has
advisory jurisdiction to render its opinion on any question of law or fact referred to it by the president.
The court also has special leave jurisdiction that grants it discretion to hear appeals involving 'any
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court
or tribunal in the territory of India' except for matters relating to the Armed Forces. Thus the Supreme
Court may decide nearly any issue that arises in Indian politics.").
124. One of the first cases after the Emergency to highlight this point was Ratlam Mun. Council v.
Vardhichand, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1622 ("[Flew profound issues of processual jurisprudence of great
strategic significance to our legal system face us and we must zero-in on them as they involve problems
of access to justice for the people beyond the blinkered rules of 'standing' of British Indian vintage.")
For other cases which followed this same trend, see Wadhwa v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579; Gupta v.
India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149; People's Union for Democratic Rights v. India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473;
Fertilizer Corp. v. India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344.
125. See, e.g., SATHE, supra note 89. Article 226 of the Indian Constitution reads:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout
the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III
and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or
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Court has defined leniently who qualifies as a litigant, without requiring
that she specify the relief being sought in order to have her case heard. 26
And since broadening its locus standi, once the Court has admitted these
cases for hearings, it has often gone on to use article 21-a guarantee that
"[n]o person will be deprived of his [or her] life or personal liberty except
according to the procedure established by law"-as a mechanism for sub-
stantively promoting women's rights, environmental rights, and civil liber-
ties.'27 That a group of Indian cause lawyers has actively worked with
grassroots leaders in championing these types of cases in court is my next
focus. 28
authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or
in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1),
without - (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support
of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard,
makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furmishes a copy of
such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such
party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the
date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so
furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period,
before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the
application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as
the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the
power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.
INDIA CONST. art. 226.
126. This is the whole point of the "writ petition" referred to above. The idea is that not just
lawyers, but ordinary citizens who may not know legalese but who have been aggrieved by the state,
should be able to access the courts and have their concerns heard by a fair, impartial judiciary.
127. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
128. As stated above and in the previous Part, the focus here is on lawyers who practice in the
upper courts. District court lawyers rarely submit article 32 petitions to the state High Court or the
Supreme Court. In fact, there are restrictions regarding who can submit such claims. If a district court
lawyer believes she needs to file an article 32 petition, she usually works with an upper court
practitioner to do so. For a host of scholarship on upper court lawyers filing article 32 petitions, see
UPENDRA BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT, AND CONTENTION (1985); P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and
Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 561 (1985); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism
and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 Am. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989);
Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the Light of
American Experience, 29 J. INDIAN L. INST. 494 (1987); Galanter, New Patterns, supra note 102, at
279-95; N.R. Madhava Menon, Justice Sans Lawyers: Some Indian Experiments, 12 INDIAN BAR REV.
446 (1985); Oliver Mendelsohn, Life and Struggles in the Stone Quarries of India: A Case-Study, 29 J.
COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 43 (1991) [hereinafter, Mendelsohn, Life and Struggles]; G.L. Peiris,
Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current Dimensions, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 66
(1991); S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism, 10 J. INDIAN SCn. POL ECON. 399 (1998); S.P. Sathe, Political
Activism (II): Post-Emergency Judicial Activism: Liberty and Good Governance, 10 J. INDIAN SCH.
POL. ECON. 603 (1998); Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of
Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIs. INT'L L.J. 58 (1994).
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C. Constitutional Rhetoric: Transforming Individual Needs into Social
Change
Indian cause lawyers have learned to recast the immediate, material,
and often life-or-death demands of grassroots movements into constitu-
tional claims that courts can handle. The evidence supporting my argument
comes from two sources. First, I conducted extensive content analysis of
the relevant case law where women's rights, civil liberties, or environ-
mental rights were at stake.'29 These issues represent three of the most
typical cause-oriented movements found in India. Second, beginning in the
late 1990s and culminating in 2004, I made repeated research visits to In-
dia. For this study, I rely on information gathered from eighty-four semi-
structured interviews-fifteen of which were with judges, forty-one with
lawyers, and twenty-eight with grassroots leaders who work on these social
policy issues.13 These interviews, as I will show, reveal several telling and
often quite moving accounts. Out of respect for some respondents' requests
for confidentiality, the interview evidence I present below is at best only a
snapshot of what is occurring on the ground. However, combining the case
law analysis with the fieldwork offers support for understanding the dy-
namics of grassroots activism on Indian cause lawyers and how these law-
yers tend to recast activists' issues.
1. Cause Lawyering for Women's Rights in India
With the Constitution's passage in 1950, Indian women received, for
the first time, the same legal rights and opportunities as men. Article 15,
section 1 of the Indian Constitution proclaims that "[t]he State will not
discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them."'' But because the framers of the
129. The case law on which I draw mainly comes from those matters litigated in the Supreme
Court. It should be noted that currently the Court has over 20,000 cases on its docket, and it is believed
to be the most crowded of any constitutional court in the world. See Bibek Debroy, Losing a World
Record, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC, Feb. 14, 2002. The docket is further divided between what Epp
categorizes as the Court's public law agenda-most of the decisions of which the Court publishes in
law reports-and the Court's "routine agenda" consisting of "tens of thousands of unpublished
decisions." Epp, supra note 50, at 90. For the most part I focus on the former and rely on Sathe, supra
note 89, for comprehensive collection and categorization of these public law cases. Drawing on Sathe's
work as well as other Indian constitutional law books, see, for example, AUSTIN, WORKING, supra note
121; BAKSHI, supra note 112; D.D. BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (1998); NOOANI, supra
note 11I, I put together a list of women's rights, civil liberties, and environmental rights cases. Further,
I used the Indian computerized database Supreme Court Judgments, at http://www.scjudgments.com, to
gather cases not found in these texts. I then read and conducted content analysis of each of these cases.
(I also relied on the indexes provided within the case reporters, but because these were sometimes
incomplete, I triangulated the information gathered from this source with case cites found within the
more scholarly books on constitutional law as well as the Supreme Court Judgments website.)
130. The majority of the interviews took place in the country's capital, New Delhi. However,
some interviews also occurred in Mumbai, Bhopal, Hyderabad, and Bangalore.
131. INDIA CONST. art. 15.
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Constitution recognized that section 1 might not be sufficient to protect the
rights of women, they included section 3, which states, "[N]othing in this
article [15] shall prevent the State from making any provision for women
and children."' 32 Courts, in fact, have permitted the government to use sec-
tion 3 to grant explicit reservations for women in the educational and pub-
lic employment sectors.133
But for the reasons stated above, a mass-scale women's movement did
not emerge before 1977.'3 Although strong groups of women existed in
colonial and even pre-colonial times, in the post-colonial era "[i]t was only
when the Emergency was lifted, some 18 months later, that ... many of the
contemporary women's groups began to get formed, with their members
often being women with a history of involvement in other political
movements." '135 Not surprisingly, women's organizations soon viewed
sympathetic political parties as key allies in the fight for gender equality. 3
A pronounced sense of rights-based consciousness and empowerment
developed,'37 and advancements in technology and communication enabled
more women from different parts of India to share their common problems,
challenges, and obstacles. 3 The new opportunities available to women
thus facilitated an exciting exchange of ideas about the various rights to
which they were long entitled, including those guaranteed to them under
the Constitution.
39
For good reason, then, these developments might suggest the presence
of a large-scale feminist movement in India, similar to the one the United
States experienced during the 1970s. But in India, the fight for women's
rights, in many ways, has been more plural and, at times, more fragmented
than the movement in the United States, often reflecting the struggle for
132. Id.
133. For an early case that discusses the reservations issue, see Andhra Pradesh v. Sagar, A.I.R.
1968 S.C. 1379. See also AUSTIN, supra note 11; AUSTIN, WORKING, supra note 121; MARC
GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES (1984). Note, during the 1960s and 1970s, the number of women
with formal education jumped, and with this education came greater exposure to the Constitution's
ideals of equality, dignity, and justice. See generally COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS ON WOMEN
EDUCATION (Usha Sharma & B.M. Sharma eds., 1995); FROM INDEPENDENCE TOWARDS FREEDOM 227
(Bharati Ray & Apama Basu eds., 1999).
134. In fact, Urvashi Butalia, the cofounder of the Indian feminist publishing house, Kali, has
argued that there has not been a single, unified feminist movement but rather one that is strongly plural,
albeit at times fragmented. See Urvashi Butalia, The Women's Movement in India: Action and
Reflection, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/indial-cn.htm (last visited Nov.
15, 2005).
135. Id.
136. RAKA RAY, FIELDS OF PROTEST: WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN INDIA 13-44 (1999).
137. RAY & BASU, supra note 133, at 227; RAJ PRUTHI & BELA RANI SHARMA, EDUCATION AND
MODERNISATION OF WOMEN IN INDIA (1995).
138. Supra note 137.
139. See ANJALi BAHUGUNA, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN RELATION TO RURAL WOMEN
(1995); COMMUNITY, GENDER AND VIOLENCE (Partha Chattejee & Pradeep Jeganathan eds., 2000);
RAY & BASU, supra note 133.
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basic survival. 41 While on occasion India's women's groups advocate for
broader public policy issues, such as pay equity, 141 much of their work re-
mains focused on issues such as combating arranged marriages for minors,
rapes committed by police officers, extortion of dowry from women's fam-
ilies, and even wife-murders, which husbands often conveniently report as
"accidental" kitchen fires. 42 Raka Ray has described how even in
progressive cities like Mumbai, Hyderabad, Delhi, and Bangalore,
women's groups confront domestic violence, sexual harassment, and lack
of access to proper health care. 1
43
Given this history, cause lawyers who work with women's organiza-
tions realize that before trying to make social change at the governmental
level, it is important to engage with and learn from those at the grassroots
level. Consider the events that led to the passage of the Criminal Code
Amendment of 1983.'" In this tragic case, two police officers were ac-
cused of raping a tribal girl, Mathura, who was brought in for questioning.
The Supreme Court ultimately heard the case and vindicated the officers,
ruling that the prosecution had failed to show that the victim had tangibly
resisted. '45
Understandably, the Mathura ruling drew a firestorm of criticism.
Various women's groups engaged in publicity campaigns and demonstra-
tions, wrote newspaper editorials, and voiced their concerns to four well-
known cause lawyers in Delhi. In an open letter to the Court's chief justice,
the lawyers chastised the decision as one of the most egregious in Indian
constitutional jurisprudence. Invoking the constitutional principles of life
and liberty,'46 equal protection,'47 and gender equality, 148 the lawyers urged
the Court, the Parliament, and the public to reexamine the treatment of
women in Indian society. 49 Through its powers under article 32, the
140. See supra note 134.
141. See RAY, supra note 136, at 3-8, 45-62; see also THE EQUAL REMUNERATION ACT, 1976, No.
25, ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, 1976.
142. For a discussion of these "kitchen-fire" deaths, see UNICEF, The Progress of Nations
1997: Women Commentary, available at http://www.unicef.org/pon97/womenlb.htm (last visited Nov.
15, 2005). For additional readings relevant to this issue, see GAIL OMVEDT, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: NEW MOVEMENTS AND NEW THEORIES IN INDIA (1990); RAY & BASU, supra note 133;
KALPANA Roy, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND DOWRY DEATHS IN INDIA (1999).
143. RAY, supra note 136, at 3-4.
144. For an overview of this episode, see Epp, supra note 50, at 105-06.
145. Tukaram v. Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 185, 189 (noting, shockingly, that "no marks of
injury were found on the person of the girl after the incident and their absence goes a long way to
indicate that the alleged intercourse was a peaceful affair, and that the story of a stiff resistance having
been put up by the girl is all false").
146. See INDIA CONST. art. 21.
147. See INDIA CONST. art. 14.
148. See INDIA CONST. art. 15.
149. See Upendra Baxi et al., Open Letter to the Chief Justice of India, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 17; see
also Upendra Baxi, The "Ultimate Violation of Self': Reflections on Judicial Discourse of Attempted
Rape, (1998) 6 S.C.C. 1, available at http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/98v6al.htm.
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Supreme Court reheard the case, although it refused to reverse its original
decision.15 Parliament eventually enacted substantive changes to the
Criminal Procedure Code (1983), effectively legislating that if women
were to enjoy full liberty and equality in Indian society, courts in the future
no longer could rely on the Mathura rationale when rendering a judgment
on sexual assault.1
5
'
The Mathura episode highlights how grassroots pressure enabled
cause lawyers to recast a concrete issue of basic security-women suffer-
ing rape while in policy custody-into a constitutional claim in order gain
the attention of the Court, Parliament, and the public at large. The lawyers'
petition helped to start a national dialogue on police abuse and the rights of
women in the criminal justice system. In several other high-profile rape
cases, grassroots leaders have worked with cause lawyers to press rape
claims in court, prompting the development of what one scholar calls the
Court's "rape jurisprudence.""'. .
In Baxi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, for example, law professor Upendra
Baxi utilized the Court's broadening of locus standi under article 32 to ar-
gue that women in state custody had substantive liberty rights under article
21 to be free from cruel and unusual treatment.5 3 The case involved
women who had been convicted of prostitution and were living in a state-
run rehabilitation home.'54 Certain wardens of the home were denying the
women food, keeping the women in squalid conditions, and even forcing
the women to have sex with them in exchange for basic needs.'55
Eventually several women in the rehabilitation home related their horrific
experiences to advocates like Lotika Sarkar, a leading grassroots women's
rights activist, scholar, and lawyer herself.'56 Sarkar worked together with
Professor Baxi in crafting the legal arguments that were eventually pre-
sented to the Court.'57 Ultimately, the Court held that the women in this
150. This opinion was unreported, although the filing of the rehearing petition is noted in Sathe,
supra note 89, at 228.
151. Epp, supra note 50, at 105-06; K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai, Women and Criminal
Procedure, in ENGENDERING LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LOTIKA SARKAR 161 (Amita Dhanda &
Archana Parashar eds., 1999).
152. SATHE, supra note 89, at 228.
153. Baxi v. Uttar Pradesh, 1981 Indlaw S.C. 33 1, para. 1.
154. Id. For a discussion of this case, see Prabha Kotiswaran, Preparing for Civil
Disobedience: Indian Sex Workers and the Law, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 171 n.29 (2001).
155. Id. at 174.
156. In 1999, two scholars put together a festschrift of Sarkar's contributions to the law and to
women's rights in India. Professor Baxi was among the contributing essay writers. See ENGENDERING
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LOTIKA SARKAR (Amita Dhanda & Archana Parashar eds., 1999).
157. Baxi, 1981 Indlaw S.C. 331; S. Muralidhar, The Case of the Agra Protective Home, in
ENGENDERING LAW, supra note 156; see also Kotiswaran, supra note 154, at 171 n.29. According to
Kotiswaran's moving description,
[C]onditions at an Agra [state-rehabilitation] home instigated two public interest petitions in
the Supreme Court of India .... The petitioners contended that while section 21 of the 1956
[Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls] Act requires that these protective
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home, as well as all individuals under state care, had a constitutional right
to humane treatment. 1
58
A few years later, efforts to raise awareness about child prostitution
and abduction in New Delhi prompted a women's-rights cause lawyer to
petition the Supreme Court for a judgment outlawing female child prostitu-
tion.159 On the clients' behalf, the lawyer alleged that young girls were be-
ing kidnapped and raped in brothels in New Delhi's red light district while
police officers looked the other way or were otherwise complicit in the
crimes.16 ° Again, grassroots advocates, through the publication of exposes,
the interviewing and counseling of victims, and the holding of awareness
seminars throughout the city, sought to convey to the Delhi public the gru-
eling conditions under which these children lived. As cited by the Court in
its opinion, these activists helped the lawyer both understand and articulate
to the justices that without judicial enforcement of the girls' fundamental
right to safety, the ban on trafficking in article 23 would be rendered mean-
ingless.161 Ultimately the Court recommended that states establish
homes be run effectively, the Agra home could not be run so at the expense of the human
rights of its inmates. Many of the female inmates suffered from mental retardation and
serious contagious diseases, but did not receive appropriate medical care. In response, the
Supreme Court ordered proper medical care for the prostitute women who were in need of
medical attention."
Kotiswaran, supra note 154, at 171 n.29.
158. Id. The sad facts of this case, however, did not end with this particular Supreme Court
judgment. Instead, there was over a decade worth of litigation regarding this matter. For instance, in
1986 Dr. Baxi filed a petition to stay the state's moving of the rehabilitation home to a different
location. See Baxi v. Uttar Pradesh, 1986 Indlaw S.C. 744. The Court ultimately refused to enjoin the
move, but it set forth specific orders requiring the home to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of its
inhabitants. However in 1996, Dr. Baxi filed a follow-up petition arguing that the rehabilitation home
was not performing its statutory duty to ensure that its residents' welfare was protected. The Court
ordered the secretary of the department of women and child development of the government of Uttar
Pradesh to ensure that the residents were humanely treated. See Baxi v. Uttar Pradesh, 1996 Indlaw
S.C. 2019. Finally, in 1997 the Court decided to turn over the oversight responsibilities of the group
home to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an independent (albeit governmental) body
in charge of monitoring human rights abuses in India. According to the Court, the NHRC would be in
the best position to supervise the activities inside the home. See Baxi v. Uttar Pradesh, 1997 Indlaw
S.C. 1647.
159. Jeet v. India, 1990 Indlaw S.C. 823; see also Kotiswaran, supra note 154. In 1956 India
passed the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (ITPA), which stoppped short of illegalizing prostitution per
se but criminalized "all related actions." Kotiswaran, supra note 154. In the years that followed, the
Indian government made varied, inconsistent, and too frequently futile efforts at dealing with the issue
of prostitution and to date has not amended the ITPA. Id. Thus, lawyers in Jeet case sought judicial
relief to obtain a definitive, sound policy judgment from the Court.
160. Jeet, 1990 Indlaw S.C. 823, para. 1.
161. See id. para. 3. As the Court's opinion noted, interviews with victims and advocates provided
the substance of the lawyers' arguments:
The petitioner has cited certain lurid tales of sex with the sickening details alleged to have
been confessed by some children and girls either escaped or rescued from the such abodes of
ill-fame. After giving a brief note on Devadasi system and Jogin tradition, the petitioner states
that this system and tradition which are still prevailing in some part of the country should be
put to an end. The ultimate plea of the petitioner is that the young children and girls forcibly
pushed into 'flesh trade' should be rescued and rehabilitated. With this petition, the petitioner
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executive committees to fight child prostitution and ordered the national
government's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to study how best to
ensure that no child is deprived of life or personal liberty, as provided for
by article 21.
In the infamous "Gajraula nuns case," women's rights groups worked
in coalition with India's Christian community to seek relief following the
rape of two Christian nuns and the physical assault of five more on their
school campus in the state of Uttar Pradesh in 1990.162 When the police
failed to respond for weeks following the attacks, activists from the two
groups began to strategize a litigation path.'63 In addition to coordinating a
temporary, national closure of all Christian educational institutions, hold-
ing vigils, condemning the attacks in the press, and peacefully taking to the
streets, the coalition decided to petition the Supreme Court."6
Violence against Christian communities was not an uncommon occur-
rence. A leading member of an Indian Christian organization involved in
the 1990 mobilization told me some years later that the Christian activists'
goal had been to use constitutional rhetoric to convey to their leaders and
lawyers that these sorts of violent acts were unacceptable, criminal, and
most importantly antithetical to a democratic society.'65 According to this
official, the leaders involved in the movement did end up "getting it,"'166
and were, in the words of Shamir and Chinski, "transformed"' 67 by their
has filed 9 affidavits said to have been sworn by 9 girls who claim to be living in the brothel
houses, pleading for rescue and a list of names of 9 girls who are mortally afraid to swear the
affidavits.
Id.
162. Cherian v. India, (1992) 1 S.C.C. 397.
165. Kirti Singh litigated the case. Rick Halperin, Death Penalty News-Worldwide (Nov. 2,
1998), http://venus.soci.niu.edu/-archives/ABOLISH/nov98/0026.html. Beyond this particular matter,
Singh has written about women's groups' advocacy for legal and constitutional rights:
The post emergency period witnessed intense and widespread movements by women's
organisations and groups to bring about law reform to deal with atrocities and violence
against women. The campaign by women's organisations and those supporting them focused
mainly on reform in the laws relating to dowry and rape. Women's organisations during the
late 1970s and early 1980s demanded from the state that sweeping amendments be introduced
in these laws to check the rising tide of crimes against women. Newspaper and media reports
had highlighted the fact of young brides being burnt for failure to bring sufficient dowry from
1978 onwards, and these became the focus for struggle by women's organisations who
formed forums like the Dahej Virodhi Chetna Manch (DVCM) to launch a united action ....
Similarly, reports of rape and sexual assault, particularly by the police and others in authority,
brought women's organisations and groups together in different cities to press for changes in
the laws relating to rape.
Kirti Singh, Women and the Law, Institute of Management and Government
Thiruvananthapuram: Training Module on Gender Issues in Development 91 (1995), available at
http://persmin.nic.in/otraining/Gender%201ssues%20(Reading%20material).pdf.
164. See id. A website that tracks violence against Christian Indians has reported on this infamous
case. See Assaults on Priests and Religious-Acts of Vested Interests?, http://www.geocities.com/
christbugle2000/persecl.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
165. Interview with anonymous subject (Dec. 23, 2001).
166. Id.
167. See Shamir & Chinski, supra note 72.
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experiences with the grassroots. Eventually it was argued in Court that to
protect the rights of religious minorities, the Court had to take an institu-
tional lead in the criminal investigation by ordering the CBI to oversee the
state police inquiry.16 The Court agreed; and, when it learned that the
agency had botched the investigation, it directly rendered monetary dam-
ages in favor of the victims. 169
In this series of litigation, grassroots activists worked with cause law-
yers to match on-the-ground realities with the larger public-policy
implications of positive social change. This symbiotic relationship has
prompted other litigation for women's rights. For instance, cause lawyers
who work on employment-based sexual harassment cases told me that they
routinely consult with activists from two women's organizations before
crafting their constitutional arguments. 7 ° The respondents mentioned that
they were simply following the lessons passed down to them by other law-
yers. Those lawyers, in turn, had studied the tactics used by earlier lawyers
who had won two important Supreme Court rulings in this area.
In each of the two precedent-setting cases, 7' the lawyers did not pre-
pare their arguments for court in isolation. Rather, after working closely
with social activists and NGOs, the lawyers argued in their respective cases
that the state had a duty to protect the individual liberty of every person in
the home and on the job. They also argued that the threat of sexual harass-
ment inhibited women from freely expressing themselves and from freely
moving within the country172 -a direct violation of article 19 and the equal
protection clause in article 14. The Court admitted the petitions in both
cases and ordered broad workplace protections for women. 173
Of course, just because these cause lawyers worked with grassroots
leaders in crafting constitutional arguments does not mean that the Indian
Supreme Court necessarily followed suit. That the Court's jurisprudence in
this area has tended to embrace the positions argued by these cause lawyers
may indeed be the result of attitudinal preferences, strategic decision-
making, or a combination of these and other reasons. The key point for our
purposes is that cause lawyers working on behalf of women's rights do not
168. Cherian v. India (Gudalure I), (1992) 1 S.C.C. 397, 397 para. 3.
169. Cherian v. India (Gudalure 11), 1995 Indlaw S.C. 1657. Some have argued, though, that the
Court issued these damages to divert attention from its inability to effectively run the investigation and
to avoid prolonging embarrassment to the state police. For another decision that has received less
public skepticism, see Goutam v. Chakraborty, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 490, where the Court held that women
under article 21 had a constitutional right to live with dignity, free from the fear of being raped.
170. Interviews with three such cause lawyers (Aug. 21, 2002).
171. See e.g., Apparel Export Promotion Council v. Chopra, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625; Vishaka v.
Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C.C. 241. For an insightful editorial on this subject, see Forge a Healthy
Workplace, THE HINDU, Dec. 21, 2003, available at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/
mag/2003/12/2 1/stories/2003122100130600.htm.
172. See Chopra, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625; Vishaka, A.I.R. 1997 S.C.C. 241.
173. See Chopra, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625; Vishaka, A.I.R. 1997 S.C.C. 241.
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pursue constitutional claims in a vacuum. Instead, as we have seen, consti-
tutional litigation can be a tactic that involves the efforts of both those at
the grassroots and the lawyers who represent them.
2. Cause Lawyering for Civil Liberties in India
Like women's rights lawyers, civil liberties cause lawyers in India
have often litigated claims by first working with local activists, then using
constitutional rhetoric to recast their constituents' plight into demands that
are acceptable to the courts.
For example, in People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v.
Union of India,'74 PUDR lawyers petitioned the Supreme Court on behalf
of Delhi-based laborers who were not being paid and were forced to work
in decrepit conditions. As the lawyers learned from these local workers,
this situation was not an isolated incident: manual laborers routinely suf-
fered abuse, non-payment of wages, and worse from their employers.1 75 In
what were often frank, emotional meetings, the labor leaders drew on their
own experiences and the experiences of others to explain to their lawyers
the importance of framing legal arguments broadly, so that if they pre-
vailed in court, manual workers as a class might benefit. 76
Drawing on this advice, the cause lawyers asked the Supreme Court
not only to affirm the existing Payment of Minimum Wage Act, a federal
law setting guidelines on both wages and hours, but also to apply article 23
of the Constitution broadly to all workers similarly situated throughout the
country. 177 The Court accepted the petition under its article 32 powers, up-
held the federal statute, and, for the first time, ruled that employers who did
not pay fair wages and provide humane working conditions to their em-
ployees would be found guilty of violating article 23.178
Another well-known illustration of grassroots leaders' assisting con-
stitutional claim-making involved a case filed soon after the end of the
174. A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473.
175. Id.; Interview with PUDR Official, in New Delhi, India (July 23, 2003). During this
interview, the PUDR official stressed how the legal organization learned an immense amount of
information from the workers on labor activity throughout India. For a background discussion of this
case, see SATHE, supra note 89, at 205-2 10.
176. Interview with PUDR Official, supra note 175.
177. PUDR, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473 INDIA CONST. art. 23 ("Traffic in human beings and begar and
other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contraventions of this provision will be an
offence punishable in accordance with law.").
178. PUDR, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473. Similarly, in Morcha v. India, 1983 Indlaw SC 192, AIR.
1984 S.C. 802, a lawyer working with oppressed bonded laborers in the Fardiabad quarries near Delhi
petitioned the Court to enforce the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1976.
The law was a piece of Emergency legislation that statutorily codified the above mentioned article 23.
The laborers had completed their project by the time the Court issued its judgment. Still, the ruling
adopted the grassroots-inspired, lawyer-driven argument in totem and, furthermore, was "pronounced in
the language of outraged morality" toward abusive employers. Id; see also Mendelsohn, supra note
128,43, 69 n.3.
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Emergency. Here, lawyers petitioned the Supreme Court in an effort to end
the beatings of prisoners by police officers. 179 The case was initiated after
an inmate, Sunil Batra, wrote directly to Chief Justice Krisha Iyer explain-
ing the horrendous conditions he was enduring in prison. Moved by the
letter, the chief justice asked members of the bar to prepare oral arguments
on this matter so that a proper, formal hearing in the Supreme Court could
proceed. 8° Although the lawyers were procedurally familiar with filing
constitutional claims, not until they met with and learned from Batra, other
prisoners, and prisoners' rights activists did they fully grasp the inmates'
perilous living conditions. 8' In court, the lawyers relayed the prisoners'
nightmarish experiences to the justices and crafted arguments around arti-
cle 21's principle that incarcerated individuals have a right to live with
dignity and to be free from torture. 8 2 The Court upheld these arguments,
179. Batra v. Delhi Admin., 1978 Indlaw S.C. 289.
180. In theory, after its expansion of locus standi, the Court has held that other cases involving the
public interest may be admitted by way of citizens writing a simple letter. However, as noted by Sathe,
supra note 89, at 205-06, as the 1980s proceeded, such "letters to individual judges... became rare."
181. As Justice Krishna Iyer writes in his opinion, Mr. Batra and his lawyer, Y.S. Chitale, together
"painted" the "lurid lot" in which Batra lived. As Batra and Chitale described to Iyer,
Grim walls glare at him [i.e., Batra] from all sides night and day; his food is inserted into the
room and his excretory needs must be fulfilled within the same space. No pillow to rest his
restless head, no light inside, save the bulb that bums blindly through the night from outside.
No human face or voice or view except the warder's constant compulsory intrusion into the
prisoner's privacy and the routine revolutions of officials' visitations, punctuated by a few
regulated visits of permitted relatives or friends, with iron bars and peering warder's presence
in between. No exercise except a generous half hour, morning and evening, in a small, walled
enclosure from where he may do asanas were he yogi, do meditation were he sanyasi and
practise communion with Nature were he Wordsworth or Whitman or break down in
speechless sorrow were he but common clay. A few books, yes; newspapers? No. Talk to
others? No, save echoes of one's own soliloquies; no sight of others except the stone mercy in
pathetic fallacy. This segregation, notwithstanding the prescribed category of visitors
permitted and censored letters allowed, argues Sri Chitale, is violation of the primordial
gregariousness which, from the beginning of the species, has been man's social milieu and so
constitutes a psychic trauma, when prolonged beyond years, too torturesome for tears, even in
our ancient land of silent mystics and lonely cavemen. For the great few, solitude sometimes
is best society but for the commonalty the wages of awesome seculsion, if spread over long
spells, is insanity. For the fevered life of the modem man, more so under the stress of
sentence, solitude is terror and cellular vacuum horror. Just think not of the contemplative
saint but of the run of the mill mortal. Cage his lonely person and monitor his mind and mood
with a sensitive understanding. Then you know that moments bear slow malice; hours hang
heavy with ennui; days drop dead, and lonely weeks wear a vicious stillness; for sure, weary
months of singleness, with monotonous nights, made more hurtful by the swarms of
mosquitoes singing and stinging, and in many cells, by the bloodthirsty armies of bugs,
invisibly emerging from nocturnal nowhere, to hide and bite, make for lunacy. Time cries halt
and the victim wonders, is death a better deal? Such is the torture and tension of the solitary
cell, picturised by counsel.
Batra v. Delhi Admin., 1978 Indlaw SC 289, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675, 1688. In fact, as a result of
working with other abused inmates, other cause lawyers subsequently filed a number of cases against
prison officials over the next two decades. See, e.g., Basu v. West Bengal, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 642; Bagga
v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 117; Javed v. Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 231; Singh v. Punjab,
A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465; Khatri v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 928; Khatoon v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360;
Ram v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 745.
182. Batra v. Delhi Admin., 1978 Indlaw SC 289, AIR 1978 S.C. 1675.
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noting that the degradation of prisoners was contrary to the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.183
Cause lawyers have employed article 21 in a range of civil liberties
litigation to highlight the everyday struggles that confront the disadvan-
taged. Lawyers have invoked article 21 to gain protection for the homeless
on the basis that an individual's right to due process prohibits the state
from conducting forced relocations without judicial process.'8 4 Article 21
has also been used to advance the rights of the ill, including requiring hos-
pitals to treat the uninsured and poor in emergency cases,'85 requiring
hospitals to have functioning medical equipment,'86 mandating that patients
in mental hospitals be treated with the utmost of care,'87 and ordering local
government enforcement of general public health mandates.'88
Of course, in all these article 21 cases the specifics of how grassroots
activists interact with their cause lawyers vary, but the general theme of
interdependence remains. For instance, in the health-related cases, I learned
that lawyers often held multiple informational meetings with aggrieved
patients to strengthen their own understanding of the issues at hand.
Capturing the sentiment, one such lawyer noted, "I play the role of a
journalist of sorts. I do a lot of interviewing and fact-gathering so that at
least I can sound like I know what I'm talking about-whether it be to the
press, other lawyers, or judges I am arguing in front of."' 89
The key point for this lawyer was that activists and patients knew the
specific policy changes they wanted. What they did not know-and where
the lawyer proved useful-was how, procedurally and mechanically, to
accomplish these goals through the courts. In a sense, then, rather than hav-
ing the lawyer guide and dictate strategy, the patients viewed the lawyer-
and the lawyer viewed himself-mainly as a vehicle for accomplishing
their agenda.
Compare this interaction with the strategy used by the lawyers in the
above-cited case involving the homeless, Olga Tellis.90 V.M. Tarkunde,
one of India's most famous cause lawyers, was particularly prominent in
this litigation. 9 ' Born in 1909, Tarkunde received his law degree from Fer-
gusson College in Pune, Maharashtra, and then received an advanced
183. Id.
184. Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., 1985 Indlaw SC 161 para. 2, 20-21, 24, 27, 31-33, 37.
185. Samity v. West Bengal, 1996 Indlaw SC 2871 para. 10-16.
186. PUCL v. India, A.I.R. 1997 Del. 395.
187. Supreme Court Legal Aid Comm. v. M.P., 1994 Indlaw SC 1642 para. 1-7.
188. K.C. Malhotra v. M.P., AIR 1994 M.P. 48; India v. S.J. Pandit, AIR 1997 Ker 152.
189. Interview with Anonymous Cause Lawyer, New Delhi, India (July 22, 2003).
190. The group of very prominent cause lawyers involved in representing the homeless included
Indira Jaisingh, Rani Jethmalani, Anand Grover, Sumeet Kachhwaha,Ram Jethmalani, V.M. Tarkunde,
Darshna Bhogilal, Indu Sharma, and P.H. Parekh.
191. See In Memoriam, Justice VM Tarkunde (1909-2004), PUCL BULLETIN, May 2004,
http://www.pucl.org/Topics/PUCL/2004/tarkunde-condolence4.htm.
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degree in law from the London School of Economics.192 Although he
joined the bar in England, he soon returned to India to become involved
with the Congress Socialist Party1 93 and joined forces with the "radical
thinker and political activist"'' 94 M.N. Roy, with the goal of advocating on
behalf of "people at the grassroots level."'95 Tarkunde worked tirelessly to
promote a secular, egalitarian, humanist society, both politically and
through the courts. Eventually he was appointed to and sat on the Bombay
High Court.'96 But Tarkunde retired early (in 1969) so that he could resume
championing the rights of the disadvantaged, which included helping to
form the early incarnation of what has become one of the most renowned
civil liberties groups in India-the People's Union for Civil Liberties
(PUCL). 197
In Olga Tellis, the Bombay city government had sought to relocate a
group of "pavement dwellers"' 98 under the auspices of an 1888, pre-
Independence ordinance known as the Municipal Corporation Act.' 99
Tarkunde, as one PUCL colleague remarked, vigorously litigated the case
as he had many of his others.2"' This individual noted how Tarkunde spent
countless hours "living" with the homeless.2"' He immersed himself in their
culture to gain a firsthand appreciation of their day-to-day lives.02
Tarkunde found that although homeless, these pavement dwellers had an
immense amount of self-pride and self-dignity, yet they were being treated
by the local government as though they did not deserve even to live. In the
Supreme Court, Tarkunde and his colleagues pressed the argument that the
justices not discard or cast away these people. Ultimately the Court agreed,
holding that the Constitution indeed affords all individuals the right to pro-
cedural due process under article 21 before the government can begin the
process of displacement.0 3 In both the health care and homeless cases dis-
cussed above, then, lawyers did not act as elite, independent agents but in-
stead cooperated with their constituents.
Though in many instances lawyers have sought to advance the civil
liberties and civil rights agendas of grassroots movements by presenting
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Tellis v. Bombay Muni. Corp., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180, available at
http://www.elaw.org/resources/printable.asp?id= 1104.
199. Id.
200. Interview with PUCL Official, Bangalore, India (Dec. 10, 2001) [hereinafter PUCL
Interview]. The Court's opinion notes that Indira Jaisingh and Ram Jethmalani joined Tarkunde in the
arguments and petition to the Court. Tellis, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180.
201. PUCL Interview, supra note 200.
202. Id.
203. See Tellis, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180.
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arguments around article 21, activist lawyers in India have exploited other
constitutional provisions as well-and not just in court. Consider the reac-
tion among a wide swath of people opposed to the famous Indra Sawhney
decision24 by the Supreme Court. In this landmark case, the lead petitioner
invoked article 16(2)-a constitutional provision that bars discrimination
on the basis of caste and class2°5-to argue that the central government's
reservation of 27% of public jobs for "backward classes" violated his right
freely to pursue meaningful employment.2 °6 Although the Court upheld the
program under article 16(4), 2o7 which gives the government great latitude
to establish such a scheme, it did set a quota ceiling of 50% and also held
that no reservations may be made in job promotions-a partial victory for
the petitioner.
What ensued, however, were "politicians and political parties of all
varieties [who] championed the cause of backward classes, giving the im-
pression that reservation in government jobs and educational institutions
[was] the ultimate solution for inequality and backwardness. '20 8 These
groups, together with lawyers and other activists, worked to pass a consti-
tutional amendment to overturn the Court's decision. 29 Primarily relying
on the tactic of lobbying, this coalition invoked the historical reasons for
article 16(4)'s passage and stressed the continued need to ensure its vi-
brancy. Ultimately, they were successful in pressuring parliamentary lead-
ers two years later to insert clause 4A into article 16, which "enabled the
state (i.e. the Union and state legislatures) to make any provisions for
reservations in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes even in
matters of promotion. "210
204. Sawhney v. India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477.
205. INDIA CONST. art. 16(2) ("No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex,
descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect
of, any employment or office under the State.").
206. Sawhney, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477. "Backward class" is a term of art that typically refers to
lower castes and tribal villagers.
207. INDIA CONST. art. 16(4) ("Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens
which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.")
208. Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Seeking Equality in Multicultural Societies
(Oct. 17, 1997) (draft paper), available at http://law.wustl.edu/Conferences/Equality/art-
23.html#fnBI 3.
209. See SATHE, supra note 89, at 94; see also Fali S. Nariman, Making a Mockery of Merit,
INDIAN EXPRESS, May 22, 2000, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/
20000522/ied22048.html.
210. See Nariman, supra note 209. The identification of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes is
important and seems purposive here by the Parliament. The amendment did not extend these types of
reservations to all backward classes. However, according to S.P. Sathe, "the Law Minister [at the time]
moving the bill [i.e. Amendment 4A] had promised in Parliament that a similar bill providing for
reservation to promote the other backward classes would also be moved." Sathe also notes that the state
of Tamil Nadu passed a law allowing for reservations to exceed the 50% marker set forth by the Indra
Sawhney court. In fact, one year after the decision, the Parliament passed a constitutional amendment
legalizing Tamil Nadu's program. SATHE, supra note 89, at 94.
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All these examples highlight a pattern similar to that found in
women's rights efforts in India. Whether the issue is prisoners' rights,
bonded labor, basic health care needs, the homeless, or the enduring effects
of caste on daily life, when Indian civil liberties cause lawyers recast the
immediate, material demands of the grassroots into constitutional claims,
there can be a mutually interactive and dependent relationship between
those formally advocating and those being represented. As the next Section
illustrates, the same dynamic holds true for those who advocate for envi-
ronmental justice.
3. Cause Lawyering for Environmental Rights in India
New Delhi-based cause lawyer M.C. Mehta is arguably the most
prominent environmental legal activist in India. Like the activist lawyers
discussed above, Mehta has relied extensively on the due process provision
of article 21 as the basis for submitting article 32 petitions in the Supreme
Court. The generality and flexibility of article 21 has allowed Mehta to
pursue in court various environmental causes that are at the core of how
people carry on their daily lives.2 '
He has, for instance, used article 21 to argue successfully that without
stricter vehicle emissions standards, people's quality of life and their lib-
erty to breathe clean air would be violated.212 He also won a judgment pro-
hibiting the dumping of industrial pollutants into lakes and rivers. 23 And
he prevailed in a case where the Court ruled that public and private owners
of diesel-run, pollution-emitting buses could be held financially liable to
the government's Director of Transportation. 1 4 In almost all of Mehta's
environmental cases, the government serves as the main defendant; Mehta
has convinced the Court that the inability of the government to protect its
citizens from environmental hazards violates the spirit of article 21 15
India's constitutional framework and the spate of environmentally-
friendly judicial rulings have inspired Mehta to continue working as a legal
champion for environmental protection.2 6 Mehta knows that he possesses
the ability to transform words on parchment into effective constitutional
rhetoric when advocating for an environmental cause in court. He is aware
that his work has already made "legal history. ' 27 But he also recognizes
211. Telephone interview with M.C. Mehta (Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Interview with M.C.
Mehta].
212. Mehta v. India, (1991) 2 S.C.C. 137. For two follow-up judgments, see also Mehta v. India,
A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 2340; Mehta v. India, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 291.
213. Mehta v. India, (1997) 2 S.C.C. 411.
214. Mehta v. India, 2002 Indlaw S.C. 1929.
215. See Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1446; Interview with
M.C. Mehta, supra note 211.
216. Interview with M.C. Mehta, supra note 211.
217. This term comes from an inscription noted on the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public
Service, given to M.C. Mehta in July 1997.
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that his efforts will be for naught if environmental activism is isolated in
the judicial arena. Mehta, hence, is a strong proponent of bringing the law
to-as well as learning from those at-the grassroots level. Since the vast
majority of causes are promoted at this level, it is crucial that everyday
Indians are aware of their rights, as well as their ability to shape the laws
under which they live." 8 Consequently, Mehta is conscientious about en-
suring that the Constitution's promises actually mean something to people
on the ground. For this reason, he devotes time not only to working in legal
literacy camps in rural villages and educating the poor on various
environmental issues, but also to learning about what issues are most im-
portant to them.219 In describing his role as the country's leading environ-
mental litigator and also as one who works with and is educated by
grassroots activists, he told a reporter from the Far Eastern Economic
Review, "An environmental lawyer should not confine actions to the court-
room."
22 0
But Mehta is not the only environmentalist to recognize the impor-
tance of blending formal and grassroots advocacy. Medha Patkar is another
well-known environmental champion who works on behalf of some of the
most economically impoverished tribal Indians whose land has been con-
demned by the government.22' Patkar is a leader in the grassroots move-
ment known as the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), which since the
early 1980s has focused on blocking the construction of a government dam
on the Narmada River.22 As Ashok Swain has commented, once completed
the dam will be the second largest "in the world, and its reservoir [would]
submerge a total of 248 villages with a population of 66,593, covering
34,996 hectares in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and
Gujarat. ' '223 Overall, nearly two million people will be affected in some
manner by the construction of the dam.
218. Interview with M.C. Mehta, supra note 211.
219. Mehta was, for example, one of the founders of the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action,
and the founder of the M.C. Mehta Environmental Foundation, described as
a non-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) working throughout India for the
protection of the environment and citizens' rights. It provides a forum for citizens, NGOs and
activists working for sustainable development and social change, and also provides
opportunities for research, training and education on environmental and social issues for
young lawyers and scientists. M.C. Mehta is using the foundation and its new facility to pass
on his invaluable experience protecting the environment through law to a new generation of
grassroots advocates around the world.
E-LAW Partners in Asia, http://www.elaw.org/custom/custompages/partnerDetail.asp?Profileid=850
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
220. Vir Singh, Guardian of the Taj, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 7, 1997, at 82.
221. Friends of the River Narmada is an affiliated website that supports Patkar's organization. See
http://www.narmada.org/medha.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
222. ASHISH KOTHARI & SHEKAR SINGH, THE NARMADA VALLEY PROJECT: A CRITIQUE (1998).
223. Ashok Swain, Democratic Consolidation? Environmental Movements in India, 37 AsIAN
SURVEY 818, 826-27 (1997).
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To protest the government project, Medha Patkar has embraced a
range of practices. She promotes the rights and customary traditions of ru-
ral citizens who face displacement, but in various venues she also empha-
sizes the moral obligation of the state to ensure that its citizens live free
from environmental erosion. 24 Although Patkar is a social worker rather
than a lawyer, she knows well two nonjusticiable articles of the Indian
Constitution, 48A and 5 1A(g).225 In her speeches and writings, she calls on
the state to be mindful of how environmental policy has real-life ramifica-
tions on individuals, especially the poor. Her masterful use of this rhetoric
has mobilized the grassroots throughout the country.
Yet, as she has noted, the impetus for her work is the passion exhib-
ited by tribal villagers, who have mobilized to protest what they see as the
destruction of their way of life.226 Professor S.P. Sathe has described how
Patkar and the villagers initially employed a series of "Gandhian
methods" '227 to express their discontent. Their "scrupulous insistence on
nonviolence" 2 8 included peaceful marches, protests, grassroots advocacy
campaigns, and political lobbying. Yet these nonviolent tactics were often
met with brutal repression from financially motivated state governments
that wanted the dam construction to continue.229 As Sathe discusses, given
that other disadvantaged groups had won protection in the Supreme Court,
the villagers viewed litigation, in spite of the time it might take, as another
nonviolent way to counter this state-sponsored violence.23° Lawyers for the
NBA soon began to cast the government's dam project as an unconstitu-
tional taking in violation of article 3 1, a violation of Article 14's equal pro-
tection clause, 231 and a violation of article 19(e)'s right "to reside and settle
in any part of the territory of India."
In contrast to the many successes of M.C. Mehta, lawyers for the
NBA have experienced a mixed set of rulings from the Supreme Court.
224. KOTHARI & SINGH, supra note 222. There are several websites dedicated to the work Patkar
has done. See, e.g., Interview by Medha Patkar with Venu Govinda, The Face of Narmada, INDIA
TOGETHER, Aug. 7, 1999, http://www.indiatogether.org/interviews/iview-mpatkar.htm; Interview by
Robert Jensen with Medha Patkar, Z ACTIVISM ONLINE, Apr. 2004, http://zmagsite.zmag.org/
Apr2004/jensen0404.html; see also Q & A: Medha Patkar, THE HINDU, Mar. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2004/O3/28/stories/2004032800971300.htm.
225. INDIA CONST. art. 48A ("The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment
and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country."); art. 5 1A(g) ("It shall be the duty of every
citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild
life, and to have compassion for living creatures.").
226. See Tanmaya Kumar Nanda, The Narmada Story, INDIAINFocOM, Oct. 18, 2000,
http://newsarchives.indiainfo.com/spotlight/narmada/narmada.html.
227. See S.P. Sathe, Supreme Court and NBA, FRIENDS OF RIVER NARMADA, Nov. 11, 2000,
http://www.narmada.org/archive/epw/novl 1.2000.sathe.html.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India." INDIA CONST. art. 14.
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The Court has had to balance the government's stated interests of pursuing
a public-policy project that would create jobs, improve the power supply,
and contribute to the economy against the interests of the local villagers.232
In 1998, the Court ruled against the NBA's petition to block the dam con-
struction, but required the government to provide habitable "relief and
rehabilitation" sites be provided to the displaced villagers.233 Upon a
repetition by the NBA seeking a complete injunction against the govern-
ment construction, the Court in 2000 refused to grant such a motion,
prompting grassroots activists and the lawyers who represented them to
criticize the decision on the grounds that the judgment contradicted the
public interest ideals of the Constitution. In noting its disgust, the NBA
stated:
The Supreme Court has violated the spirit of the Constitution of
India and democratic governance. The court has totally neglected
the fundamental rights of the most vulnerable section of our society
and also the serious issues raised regarding the propriety of the
dam. Instead, it has provided a weapon in the hands of the
powerholders to indiscriminately displace the project affected
people and crush their rights ... The court seems to have done a
disservice to the Indian Constitution, Indian democracy and Indian
people. The judgment is unjustifiable, reactionary and hence,
unacceptable. The NBA would fight against this injustice at the
hands of the judiciary tooth and nail. We call upon the people of
India who value democracy and Constitution to challenge this
decision and ask the court to restore the people's rights in the
Narmada valley. 34
The NBA would again petition the Supreme Court, this time arguing
that the rights of specific displaced villagers in the state of Madhya Pradesh
(MP) had been breached by the government. In March 2005, the Court reit-
erated its earlier order that people involuntarily moved by the dam con-
struction be justly compensated and relocated to habitable land.235 In its
232. For an article that describes the different positions that the Court had to consider on this
matter, see V. Venkatesan, Threat of Submergence, 16 FRONTLINE, July 3-16, 1999, available at
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1614/16140350.htm.
233. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. India, 1998 Indlaw S.C. 1602. The decision sparked angry
protests from, among others, Medha Patkar and celebrated author Arundhati Roy. Both activists
publicly and repeatedly chided the Court. In a subsequent ruling in 1999, the Court lashed back,
warning that such "vicious stultification and vulgar debunking cannot be permitted to pollute the stream
of justice." Narmada Bachao Andolan v. India, 1999 Indlaw S.C. 780 para. 6. After another Court
ruling in 2002, Roy was convicted of contempt of court after she refused to scale back her verbal and
written attacks. She served one day in jail and paid a fine. See J. Venkatesan, Arundathi Roy Jailed for
Contempt of Court, THE HINDU, Mar. 7, 2002, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/03/07/stories/20020307060601 00.htm.
234. Press Release, Narmada Bachado Andolan, Without Considering Basic Issues, Supreme
Court Surrenders the Pressures by Power Holders (Oct. 18, 2000), http://www.irn.org/programs/
indial00 10 19.narmadapr.html.
235. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. India, 2005 Indlaw S.C. 241.
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ruling, the Court chastised the state government for failing to pay compen-
sation settlements to residents of two adversely affected MP villages and
for not adequately offering replacement property; it ordered these remedies
forthwith.236 Many, including Medha Patkar, praised the ruling.237 But the
Court did not halt the overall dam construction, to the concern of some
NBA supporters.23 Lawyers and activists thus continue to press claims on
behalf of the villagers by drawing on the fundamental rights of the
Constitution, and accordingly, they are considering submitting new peti-
tions in the Supreme Court.
The equivocal attitude of the Court on the NBA dam project, how-
ever, has not deterred other environmental lawyers and grassroots activists
from advocating for those most in need of basic environmental protection.
For example, spurred on by a once nearly destroyed but yet presently vi-
brant and angry grassroots constituency, cause lawyers representing the
victims of the 1984 Bhopal chemical disaster have sought to reopen the
case. The lawyers have argued that the settlement between Union Carbide
and the government of India (which represented the plaintiffs)23 9 has failed
to remedy the unbearable suffering that still plagues the many thousands
who were injured by the gas leak.24°
In 2004 I spent time in Bhopal and witnessed firsthand the emotions
of those devastated by this disaster. Even though two decades had passed,
there were still grassroots activists who were more determined than ever to
236. Id.
237. Medha Patkar, Latest Judgment Proves It All, INDIA TOGETHER, Apr. 28, 2005,
http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/apr/opi-vindicate.htm.
238. For reaction to the March 15, 2005, verdict, see Friends of the River Narmada website at
http://www.narmada.org.
239. Sahu v. India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480 (permitting the government to step in and represent the
interests of those who were victims of the gas leak).
240. The politics of the December 4, 1984, Bhopal disaster are quite complicated. Indeed, because
of the terribly high number of cases backlogging the Indian court system (and the possibility of getting
greater monetary damages in the United States), the Indian govemment pushed to have the case against
Union Carbide tried in the United States (The government of India in 1985 passed the Bhopal Act,
which allowed it to represent the victims of the Bhopal disaster in the U.S. courts.) The Indian
government then came to the United States and hired what is today the law firm of Robbins, Kaplan,
Miller & Ciresi in Minneapolis to represent its interests. (Robbins had made its name in plaintiff's
litigation with its lawsuit over the Dalcon Shield birth control devices.) The case was heard in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York. Union Carbide in 1985 moved to have the case
dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. In 1986, the district court granted this motion and
transferred the case back to India. The case was then assigned to a district court in Bhopal, Madhya
Pradesh, where in 1988 an Indian judge granted interim financial relief to the victims. This decision
was appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which, although overruling the lower court's
decision, curiously cited a British statute in granting its own interim relief to the victims. The case then
was appealed to the Indian Supreme Court, which took the unusual step in February 1989 of structuring
a settlement between the government of India and Union Carbide whereby the latter was to pay out
$470 million dollars in damages to the victims-a wholly inadequate sum according to representatives
of the victims. We are past the twentieth anniversary of the Bhopal disaster, and, sadly, most of the
victims still have not received compensation for their injuries.
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see that those who suffered so greatly finally receive fair compensation.
Many of these activists were relatives of the dead. Through their mobiliza-
tion efforts and eloquent pleas, they worked with cause lawyers to press the
case that the victims to this day had not had their rights-to live a healthy
life, free from illness caused by Union Carbide's tortious acts-realized.
In particular, as I was told during my visit, the victims and their fami-
lies had initiated a petition in the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that
the government of India release to them the remaining money ($327.5 mil-
lion dollars) it had obtained from the overall $800 million dollar settlement
reached with Union Carbide. In July 2004 the Supreme Court ordered the
government to distribute these funds to the nearly 500,000 "victims and
dependents" of this tragedy.24' As many of us who have followed these
events know, even counting the $327.5 million dollars, the total sum was a
woefully inadequate amount given the devastation. Yet this recent victory
provides some hope that legal action in the future by the victims might
once again be successful (although, as one of the lawyers for the victims
ominously reminded observers after the Court's ruling, "there's always a
gap between the Court's orders and the way it is implemented, so we shall
keep our fingers crossed" 242).
CONCLUSION
The debate over why and how cause lawyers do what they do is one in
which scholars have engaged for years. The literature to date has moved
the discourse significantly forward by underscoring the many different as-
pects of cause lawyering and highlighting the varying opportunities, incen-
tives, and constraints that are faced by those who pursue this legal path. To
their immense credit, Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold's work over the
years has generated a wealth of scholarship on cause lawyering, including
recent and compelling studies that examine the interplay between grass-
roots demands and lawyers' responses.
I have sought to build on these latest works by focusing on how grass-
roots leaders can help cause lawyers understand the situations they and
their constituents face, and by showing, both from a comparative and em-
pirical perspective, how those at the grassroots level can shape the way
cause lawyers deploy constitutional litigation. Although cause lawyers rely
on varied forms of advocacy, constitutional litigation remains a "primary
agent of liberal democratic cause lawyering." '243 And while the conven-
tional wisdom is that this strategy is lawyer-run, the evidence presented in
241. Court Relieffor Bhopal Victims, BBC NEWS (World Edition), July 19, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/390669 1.stm.
242. Id.
243. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 18, at 103.
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this study suggests that cause lawyers clearly do not make decisions on
constitutional litigation independent of grassroots constituents.
This account will no doubt raise questions for some readers. For in-
stance, some may wonder how representative my evidence is of constitu-
tional cause lawyering generally, and even within India itself. After all,
India's population is over one billion; can one possibly marshal the exist-
ing data accurately to extrapolate what is occurring in other parts of the
country, let alone in other societies? In addition, some may argue that the
issues on which I focus include a bias (and thus limitation) to my findings.
Women's rights, civil liberties, and the environment readily lend them-
selves to mobilization and participation by the grassroots.
And then there will be those who suggest that I have romanticized the
impact grassroots members can have on how lawyers use tactics like con-
stitutional litigation. As I have been told by my skeptics, Supreme Court
lawyers in India are, simply put, elitists. While lawyer-grassroots interac-
tion may have been prevalent immediately after the Emergency Period, that
happy marriage was short-lived. Today, Indian Supreme Court lawyers are
isolated actors who generally are not concerned about receiving input from
those on the ground. Because the Indian system allows lawyers to file peti-
tions without even having clients, the advocacy in which these lawyers en-
gage is likely to be more about personal ego-enhancement than about
helping or listening to the grassroots. And all this should not be surprising,
this argument goes, because in India caste and class hierarchy and the divi-
sions between the "haves" and "have-nots" are as deeply entrenched as
anywhere in the world. If, by chance, local leaders are affecting cause
lawyering behavior, then it is more likely at the margins than directly; any
interpretation otherwise only does a disservice to the study of legal mobili-
zation in India.
In terms of sample size, for the reasons stated in Part III.C, the em-
pirical evidence offered is only a snapshot of interaction between grass-
roots activists and cause lawyers in India. Obviously these findings may
not necessarily be indicative of what is transpiring throughout India or
among all cause lawyers. More testing is needed in different settings and
along different issues to uncover whether the findings here are the norm or
an anomaly. Yet to dismiss this study's findings on the basis of sample size
or issue selection is myopic because it stultifies the asking of larger theo-
retical questions regarding cause lawyering, and it essentially casts aside
much of the insightful socio-legal literature upon which this study is
based-a literature that, without question, has increased our understanding
of the legal profession.
As for romanticizing traditionally marginalized grassroots individu-
als' effect on constitutional cause lawyers, indeed, studies that concentrate
on oft-overlooked populations or issues occasionally can be Pollyanna-ish
[Vol. 94:575
LA WYERING FOR A CA USE
and excessively laudatory. 2" But the past two decades have seen a steady
growth of careful works, on South Asia in particular, that focus on margin-
alized groups. 245 Although these works vary in specific subject matter and
methodological approaches, most are unified around the idea that for too
long scholars have emphasized state and societal elites as being the main
actors influencing how law and politics develop. As many of these studies
show, however, dating back to colonial and even pre-colonial times mar-
ginalized populations at various periods have drawn upon their own norms,
beliefs, and identities to become politicized agents capable of enacting so-
cial change, though not all such populations can and do behave in the same
manner.246 To use Sarat and Scheingold's parlance, some have the opportu-
nities or resources to become more mobilized while others face greater
constraints. But because the evidence presented here shows awareness and
mobilization among three sets of grassroots actors, it adds an important
empirical layer to this burgeoning literature.
In sum, my hope is that this study will provide useful lessons for fu-
ture scholars examining cause lawyering and state-and-society relations
more generally, both in the United States and in other societies around the
world.
244. One recent book that comes to mind is WERNER MENSKI, HINDU LAW (2003), a 600-page
opus which attempts to argue that various interpretations to date by legal and religious scholars of
Hindu law have failed to detect and understand the fair, equitable, and comprehensively just nature of
this ancient code. For an insightful, powerful critique of Menski's book, see Donald R. Davis, Jr.,
Traditional Hindu Law in the Guise of Post-Modernism:' A Review Article, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 735
(2004) (book review).
245. The University of Virginia has put together a wonderful online bibliography of such works.
For a wide array of citations, see http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/subalterm/ssmap.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005).
246. Id. Arguably the most renowned scholar writing on subalternality has been Professor Partha
Chatterjee. For a selected sample of relevant works, see PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS
FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES (1993); PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE POLITICS
OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD (2004); Partha
Chatterjee, Two Poets and Death: On Civil and Political Society in the Non-Christian World, in
QUESTIONS OF MODERNITY (Timothy Mitchell ed., 2000).
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